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NO GENETIC TIES, NO MORE FATHERS:
VOLUNTARY ACKNOWLEDGMENT
RESCISSIONS AND OTHER PATERNITY
DISESTABLISHMENTS UNDER ILLINOIS
LAW
BY
JEFFREY

A. PARNESS"

INTRODUCTION

Public policy for all governments within the United States
supports early, accurate, informed, and conclusive legal
designation of parenthood as of the time of birth.' Genetic ties
often, but not always, determine or help to determine legal
parentage at the time of birth.'
Where births result from
consensual sexual intercourse between adults, genetic ties always
determine maternity and usually determine or help to determine
paternity.3 With men, even where genetic ties are determinative
Professor of Law, Northern Illinois University College of
Law. B.A.,
Colby College; J.D., The University of Chicago Law School. Thanks to Mark
Harper, Mia Hoffman, and Josh Smith, all one-time NIU students, for their
excellent research assistance.
1. A 1992 federal study, entitled "Supporting Our Children," said this:
Parentage determination does more than provide genealogical clues to a
child's background; it establishes fundamental emotional, social, legal
and economic ties between parent and child. It is a prerequisite to
securing financial support for the child and to developing the heightened
emotional support the child derives from enforceable custody and
visitation rights. Parentage determination also unlocks the door to
government provided dependent's benefits, inheritance, and an accurate
medical history for the child.
U.S.COMM'N ON INTERSTATE CHILD SUPPORT, SUPPORTING OUR CHILDREN: A
BLUEPRINT FOR REFORM 120 (1992).

2. This paper employs the terms "maternity" and "paternity" to cover legal
designations of parentage operative as of the time of birth, though the conduct
prompting at least certain paternity designations may occur long after birth
(and include at times holding a born child out as one's own, and supporting
that child financially).
3. In re Estate of Poole, 799 N.E.2d 250, 256-59 (Ill. 2003) (noting that a
parent and child relationship does not arise under law for a man simply
because no one disputes biological parentage; statutes often seek to insure
1295
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or important, often the presence of genetic linkage is only
presumed. Paternity presumptions can, however, arise in settings
where there is little chance of actual genetic ties, and such
presumptions frequently are subject to rebuttal through testing
long after birth.
Paternity presumptions usually arise for husbands when
children are born to their wives.4 In contrast, where mothers are
unmarried, paternity founded on actual, presumed, or alleged
genetic ties can arise from varying acts, including voluntary
acknowledgments, lawsuits, concessions, and actual parenting.
Male assumptions about the presence of genetic ties may be
needed to undertake certain formal acts (such as voluntary
acknowledgments), or can simply prompt other human conduct
(such as concessions or defaults in lawsuits, or actual parenting)
having legal paternity consequences. In over little more than a
decade, paternity establishments for children born to unwed
mothers in Illinois have most frequently arisen from voluntary
paternity acknowledgments, usually completed in hospitals shortly
after birth.5
Initial legal paternity designations can be overcome, however.
Marital presumptions as well as paternity presumptions involving
children born to unwed mothers may be rebutted via testing, at
times long after birth. The standards for disestablishing legal
paternity of children born to unmarried women based upon a lack
that legal fathers "are parents in more than the genetic sense").
4. Paternity presumptions may also arise for former husbands, as when
their former wives conceived or were pregnant at some time during the
marriage. See, e.g., 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 45/5(a)(1) (creating a presumption of
natural fatherhood for a husband where child is "born or conceived" during
marriage).
5. For example, in Illinois in 1994 there were no in-hospital voluntary
paternity acknowledgments, in 1995 there were 874, in 1996 there were 4,626,
and in 1997 there were 29,220.
THE OFFICE OF CHILD SUPPORT
ENFORCEMENT, U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, TABLE 39A: INHOSPITAL VOLUNTARY PATERNITY ACKNOWLEDGMENTS,
available at
http://www.acfhhs.gov/programs/csepubs/1998/reports/22nd-annualreportc
ongress/st39a.pdf Similar increases have occurred in other states. For
example, California went from 4,323 in 1994, to 126,922 in 1998. In Michigan,
by contrast, there were 19,677 in 1994, and 22,437 in 1998. Id.
6. Herein, I employ the phrase "legal paternity" (as well as "legal
fatherhood," "genetic father in law" and "father under law") to encompass legal
designations of fatherhood as of the time of birth, whether or not such
designations are made at birth or later and whether or not they are founded
on circumstances existing at the time of birth (e.g., genetic ties or marriage) or
thereafter (e.g., actual parenting). I assume here that only a man (whether or
not impotent) may be subject to a legal paternity designation. But see Smith v.
Cole, 553 So. 2d 847 (La. 1989) (noting that "dual paternity" is recognized in
Louisiana); In re Jesusa V., 85 P.3d 2 (Cal. 2004) (holding that there may be
two competing paternity presumptions for a child at birth, though only one
man is then deemed by a court to be the father under law).
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of genetic ties sometimes preclude certain nongenetic fathers from
pursuing rebuttal even when other nongenetic fathers, genetic
fathers, children, mothers, or state welfare agencies may pursue
rebuttal for the same reason. Any legal distinctions between those
pursuing paternity disestablishment, of course, must be
reasonable and comport with federal, and state constitutional
safeguards. Unfortunately, certain contemporary distinctions in
Illinois paternity disestablishment laws are unsound on policy
grounds, if not unconstitutional.! These distinctions became quite
evident in the 2004 Illinois Supreme Court decision involving
Romel Smith.'
This paper begins, in Part I, by examining federal paternity
standards involving voluntary paternity acknowledgments of
children born to unmarried women.
These standards are
increasingly important as voluntary acknowledgments are now
typically required for birth certificate recognitions of paternity and
as the number of births to unmarried women in the United States
has doubled in the past two decades.9 Part II of this paper then
illustrates the nationwide confusion that results when males
initiate paternity disestablishment proceedings seeking to rescind
voluntary paternity acknowledgments based on lack of genetic
ties."
Next, in Part III the paper reviews other paternity
disestablishment standards in Illinois. In doing so, it reveals that
the conditions for paternity disestablishment frequently are
dependent upon the same techniques employed for paternity
establishment. Here, certain legal distinctions are, at the least,
unsound. The paper concludes in Part IV with suggested reforms
for both federal and Illinois laws on initial paternity
designations,1 and on later paternity disestablishments.
7. See, e.g., In re D.W., 827 N.E.2d 466 (Ill. 2005) (holding that statute
differentiating between categories of genetic mothers subject to parental
rights terminations violated equal protection).
8. People v. Smith, 818 N.E.2d 1204 (Ill. 2004).
9. There were about 660,000 in 1980 and about 1.4 million in 2002. See 52
NAT'L VITAL STAT. REP. No. 10, at 10 (2003) (showing also that the percent of
births to unmarried women rose from about nineteen to thirty-four percent
during the same time).
10. There is some evidence that many acknowledgments are incorrect in
asserting, without testing, the existence of genetic ties between the signing
father and the child. See, e.g., Who Is Your Daddy?, 24 J. JUVENILE L. 91, 99
(2003) ("[TIhe American Association of Blood Banks reported that in 1999,

thirty percent of 280,000 cases excluded the tested men as the father of the
tested child.").
11. Early, accurate, informed and conclusive legal paternity designations
are crucial not only to genetic fathers and nongenetic fathers who actually
parent from birth, but also to mothers, their children, and others (such as

grandparents). See, e.g., James A. Gaudino Jr., et al., No Fathers'Names: A
Risk Factor for Infant Mortality in the State of Georgia, USA, 48 SOc. ScI. &

MED. 253, 263 (1999) (concluding that "missing fathers' names on birth
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FEDERAL MANDATES ON ESTABLISHING AND RESCINDING
VOLUNTARY PATERNITY ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Under federal law, voluntary paternity acknowledgment
standards for births to unmarried women originate in the Personal
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996.1
There, Congress replaced the Aid to Families with Dependent
Children (AFDC) program, contained in Title IV-A of the Social
Security Act, with a program of block grants to the states for
Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF)." Although
state participation in the TANF (and AFDC) program was
voluntary, participation
required
compliance
with the
requirements of Title IV-D of the Social Security Act and with its
accompanying regulations, including mandates regarding
paternity establishment. 4
Within Title IV-D, Congress enacted guidelines to improve
paternity establishment techniques as well as the enforcement of
child support orders. One key provision requires unwed mothers
receiving public aid to cooperate "in good faith" in establishing
legal paternity in the genetic father where appropriate (as with
most unmarried mothers who bear children as a result of
consensual sexual intercourse between adults). 5
Another
important section addresses voluntary acknowledgments of
paternity by putative fathers. 6 In this section, Congress described
methods by which a participating state must provide a putative
father with the opportunity to execute a voluntary
acknowledgment. 7 One general provision requires states to
certificates, a measure of paternity, was a more important risk factor for
infant mortality in Georgia than unmarried status. This finding suggests that
fathers, in some way, may influence infant health").
12. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of
1996, Pub.L. 104-93, 110 Stat. 2105 (codified in scattered sections of 42

U.S.C.).

13. Temporary Assistance for Needy Families Act, 42 U.S.C. § 601 (2000).
14. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 654(20) (child support enforcement effectiveness);
42 U.S.C. § 666(a)(2) (expedited administrative and judicial procedures for
establishing paternity). The limits on federal funding programs conditioned
on compliance with Congressional mandates are reviewed in South Dakota v.
Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987).
15. 42 U.S.C. § 654(29)(A).
16. 42 U.S.C. § 666(a)(5)(C)-(E); see also Jayna Morse Cacioppo, Note,
Voluntary Acknowledgments of Paternity: Should Biology Play a Role in
Determining Who Can Be a Legal Father?,38 IND. L. REV. 479, 486-88 (2005)
(reviewing the guidelines and their history).
17. See 42 U.S.C. § 666(a)(5)(C) (requiring a state to provide the
opportunity in a hospital or in a state agency office). Incidentally, such
acknowledgments may go by different names in state statutes. See, e.g., N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 9:17-41 (West 2006) ("Certificate of Parentage"); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 26:8-28.1 (West 2006) (noting that a "Certificate of Parentage ... shall serve
as the voluntary acknowledgment of paternity by a father").
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establish procedures for a "simple civil process for voluntarily
acknowledging paternity."18 Another, more specific, provision
declares that states should have procedures for a "hospital-based
program for the voluntary acknowledgment of paternity focusing
on the period immediately before or after the birth of a child."9
Yet another provision says "the State agency responsible for
maintaining birth records" must offer "voluntary paternity
establishment services." ° State laws must follow these federal
guidelines" in order for states to participate in Title IV-D
programs.
Related federal law requires states to develop procedures to
include the name of the father on the birth certificate of a child of
unmarried parents, but only if "the father and mother have signed
a voluntary acknowledgment of paternity" or if "a court or an
administrative agency of competent jurisdiction has issued an
adjudication of paternity."2"
Another says that states must
consider a signed voluntary acknowledgment of paternity to be a
legal finding of paternity." This legal finding can be rescinded,
however, within the earlier of: (1) sixty days of the signing; or (2)
"the date of an administrative or judicial proceeding relating to the
child (including a proceeding to establish a support order) in which
the signatory is a party."2"
Thereafter, a signed voluntary
acknowledgment of paternity can be challenged only on the "basis
of fraud, duress, or material mistake of fact, with the burden on
proof upon the challenger."2
Federal statutes do not provide meaning for the terms
"fraud," "duress" or "material mistake of fact," nor do federal
regulations or the legislative history of the Social Security Act.
One federal regulation does say that when there are allegations
that "fraud has been practiced" in a TANF program the "definition
of fraud... will be determined in accordance with State law." In
other federal programs, similar terms have been specifically
defined. For example, when the Department of Housing and
18. 42 U.S.C. § 666(a)(5)(C)(i).
19. 42 U.S.C. § 666(a)(5)(C)(ii).
20. 42 U.S.C. § 666(a)(5)(C)(iii)(I).
21. There are both federal statutory - for example, parent's social security
numbers - and federal regulatory, as established by the Secretary of the
Department of Health and Human Resources, guidelines. E.g., 42 U.S.C.
§ 652(a)(7); 42 U.S.C § 666(a)(5)(c)(iv).
22. 42 U.S.C. § 666(a)(5)(D)(i)(I)-(II).
23. 42 U.S.C. § 666(a)(5)(D)(ii).
24. 42 U.S.C. § 666(a)(5)(D)(ii)(I)-(II).
25. 42 U.S.C. § 666(a)(5)(D)(iii).
Implementation of these rescission
standards, on occasion, proves challenging. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:17-41b
(providing for rescissionrescission within 60 days); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:8-30
(West 2006) (seemingly declaring that rescissionrescission may occur within
60 days only for "fraud, duress or material mistake of fact").
26. 45 C.F.R. § 235.110 (2005).
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Urban Development seeks a recovery based on fraud, it is defined,
in part, as "a single act or pattern of actions.., that constitutes
false statement, omission, or concealment of a substantive fact,
made with intent to deceive or mislead."27
And, when an
individual represents a client before the United States Patent and
Trademark Office, fraud means "conduct having a purpose to
deceive and not merely negligent misrepresentation or failure to
apprise another of relevant information.""8 Within Title IV-D and
related written federal laws, it remains unclear whether for fraud
there must be an "intent" or "purpose" to "deceive."
While federal lawmakers have remained silent on the
meaning of fraud, duress, and material mistake of fact in
voluntary paternity acknowledgment settings, surely paternity
disestablishments have now become more difficult. A Maine case
illustrates an earlier, more sympathetic attitude toward
nongenetic
fathers
who challenged
voluntary
paternity
acknowledgments. The case involved Jerome Blaisdell, who lived
with Pamela Flewelling beginning in 1991.2 Between 1993 and
1996 Jerome worked in northern Maine during the week,
returning home to Pamela only on weekends."0 In 1994 Pamela
gave birth to a son, Ryan."' A trial court found that at the time of
birth, Jerome "was aware of the possibility" that he was not Ryan's
genetic father. 3' Nevertheless, in the Fall of 1996, Jerome signed
papers acknowledging paternity." Later that year, the Maine
Department of Human Services (DHS) commenced a paternity
proceeding. In doing so, it advised Jerome he "could undergo
genetic testing."34 Jerome declined and a trial court ordered him to
pay past and future child support." In June, 1999 the relationship
between Jerome and Pamela ended, a relationship which the
Maine
high
court later
said Jerome
"believed" was
"monogamous." 6 At the time of the breakup, Pamela told Jerome
"he was not Ryan's [genetic] father," shocking Jerome. 7 As time

27. 24 C.F.R. § 792.103 (2005).

28. 37 C.F.R. § 11.1 (2005).
29. Dep't. of Human Services v. Blaisdell (Blaisdell I), 816 A.2d 55, 55 (Me.

2002).

30. Dep't. of Human Services v. Blaisdell (Blaisdell II), 847 A.2d 404, 405

(Me. 2004).

31. Blaisdell 1, 816 A.2d at 55.
32. Blaisdell 1I, 847 A.2d at 404.

33. Id. at 405-06 (Jerome "freely acknowledged paternity").

34.
35.
36.
37.

Id.
Id.
Blaisdell I, 816 A.2d at 56.
Id.
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8
passed, Jerome heard "persistent rumors,"
finally prompting him
3
1
2001.
in
testing"
to obtain "genetic
In March, 2001 Jerome moved to modify the 1996 judgment
under a Maine civil procedure rule allowing modification for a
"reason justifying relief."' The trial court granted the motion and
the parties agreed that the trial court "acted within its discretion
in amending the 1996 judgment to indicate Blaisdell [was] not the
child's father.""'
There was no mention of fraud, duress or
material mistake of fact; of the true genetic father (and whether he
had ever stepped up to, or was forced into, parental
responsibilities); of the reasonableness of the timing of Jerome's
suspicion nor of the time lag in Jerome's pursuit of testing once he
had cause for suspicion; or, of Pamelas's, or Ryan's, or Maine's
stance on disestablishment. 2 Under TANF-driven mandates in
Maine today,' Jerome's road to paternity disestablishment likely
would be far more rocky, whether or not his acknowledgment was
guided by federal law."

38. Id.
39. Blaisdell11, 847 A.2d at 405.
40. Blaisdell 1, 816 A.2d at 56 (citing ME. R. OF CIV. P. 60(b)(6)).
41. Blaisdell 11, 847 A.2d at 406. Additionally, in Blaisdell I the court had
found that DHS had a "vested right to the overdue payments" though Jerome
would have no new support obligations; DHS had a right to payments as it had
"furnished support" for Ryan. 816 A.2d at 56.
42. Pamela and Ryan, upon the high court directive in Blaisdell I,
"participated" in the proceeding involving Jerome's request for modification of
the 1996 judgment, but may not have been included within the "parties" who
agreed the trial court acted "within its discretion" in granting the request. Id.
at 405-406.
43. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A, § 1616(1) (2006) (providing that after the
right to rescind within 60 days ends, a signed voluntary paternity
acknowledgment may be challenged in court only for "fraud, duress or
material mistake of fact").
44. Not all court-labeled paternity acknowledgments may be subject to
federal guidelines. The "simple civil process for voluntarily acknowledging
paternity" subject to federal limitations, 42 U.S.C. § 666(a)(5)(C)(i), may
extend only to "hospital-based" acknowledgments "immediately before or
after" birth, 42 U.S.C. § 666(a)(5)(C)(ii), and to "State agency.. voluntary
paternity establishment services," 42 U.S.C. § 666(a)(5)(C)(iii). Thus, for
example, acknowledgments during in-court paternity proceedings technically
may not be limited by federal rescission guidelines. See, e.g., F.B. v. A.L.G.,
821 A.2d 1157 (N.J. 2003) (holding that man who "acknowledged under oath"
that he was the genetic father during a "typical paternity and support action"
against him and also was described as having "signed... sworn Admission of
Paternity," could seek disestablishment under the law on relief from
judgments). However, in F.B., no mention is made of New Jersey Statute
§ 9:17-41b on rescissionrescissions of voluntary acknowledgments based on
fraud, duress, or mistake grounds, though fraud was relevant in the Rule 4:501 analysis. Yet troublesome equality issues clearly arise when states
differentiate comparable statements acknowledging paternity by where the
statements were signed. It is unclear where Jerome Blaisdell signed his
acknowledgment.
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The lack of precise federal standards on fraud, duress, and
material mistake has led to the use of state laws without much
inquiry into the balance of federal and state governmental
interests. Such interests include the desirability for uniformity
via the use of federal law and the traditional federal constitutional
deference to state laws on family matters. As a result, there is no
uniform treatment of similarly-situated men who voluntarily
acknowledge paternity in the absence of genetic ties,45 though
uniformity could be achieved by more particular federal laws. The
following cases illustrate interstate differences on fraud, duress,
and material mistake of fact.'
II.

STATE LAWS ON RESCINDING VOLUNTARY PATERNITY
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS BY NONGENETIC DADS

A. Illinois
In September, 2004, the Illinois high court decided People v.
Smith. The case involved Romel Smith, an unwed man who
sought to rescind his October 11, 1997 in-hospital voluntary
paternity acknowledgment to Kendra Smith, born October 9,
1997, 47 that established a presumption he was "the natural
father."'
The rescission request was based on an erroneous
"representation" of his genetic ties by the unwed mother, Valerie
Dawson,49 around the time of birth. Romel attempted rescission
after DNA testing in 2002 established a lack of genetic ties.5'
45. There is also no uniformity in many other realms of American paternity
law. See, e.g., David D. Meyer, Parenthoodin a Time of Transition: Tensions
Between Legal, Biological and Social Conceptions of Parenthood, 54 AM. J.
COMP. L. 125, 126-27 (2006) (noting that "it is plain enough that social and
legal conceptions of what it means to be a 'parent' are now in play as never
before").
46. There are other interstate differences on rescissions of federally-guided
voluntary paternity acknowledgments. For example, in some, but not all
states there are time limits on presenting fraud, duress, or material mistake
challenges to earlier acknowledgments. Compare, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch.
209C, §11 (2004) ("challenge within one year"), with 750 ILL. COMP. STAT.
45/6(d) (2004) (no time limit mentioned), and N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 516-a(b)
(McKinney 2005) (no time limit mentioned).
47. Smith, 818 N.E.2d at 1205.
48. 750 ILL. CoMP. STAT. 45/5(a)(3) (2004).
49. Smith, 818 N.E.2d at 1206. Smith signed the acknowledgment at the
hospital two days after Kendra's birth; the acknowledgment was a two-sided
legal form developed by the Illinois Department of Public Aid. Brief of the
Plaintiff-Appellee, Illinois v. Smith, No. 97120, 2004 WL 3221803, at *4 (Ill.
March 2, 2004). The form was also signed by Valerie who therein claimed that
Romel "is the biological father of this child". Petition for Leave to Appeal,
Illinois v. Smith, No. 97120, 2003 WL 24033201, at *6 (Ill. October 10, 2003).
50. Smith, 818 N.E.2d at 1206 (noting that Romel undertook testing
because Kendra "did not share any of his physical characteristics"). The
testing evidently was done "without Valerie's permission or knowledge" during
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Romel's request was opposed by the state, which had secured a
court order of child support against Romel on behalf of the
Department of Public Aid in 1998.5" Romel failed in his effort to
rescind as the high court determined that section 5 of the Illinois
Parentage Act makes conclusive the presumption of natural
fatherhood arising out of Romel's voluntary acknowledgment of
paternity. Under sections 5(a) and (b), there could be no easy
rescission if the acknowledgment was not challenged before the
earlier of: (1) sixty days after the acknowledgment was signed; or
(2) the date of an administrative or judicial proceeding involving
the child in which the signatory was a party.52 Thereafter, Section
6(d) of the Act only allows a challenge by a presumed natural
father like Romel "on the basis of fraud, duress, or material
mistake of fact. " ' The court did not rule on whether fraud, duress,
or material mistake of fact applied to Romel, as these issues were
not properly raised.' It did say, however, that any post-sixty day
attack on these issues would be governed by the Civil Procedure
Code provision on relief from judgments55 as well as by federal
laws.'
The Illinois high court also suggested that if the legal
a period when Romel had visitation. Petition for Leave to Appeal, supra note
49, at *7.
51. Smith, 818 N.E.2d at 1206-07.
52. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 45/5(a)(3), (b) (2004). The same standard applies
to a voluntary acknowledgment of parentage. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 45/5(a)(4),
(b) (2004). Notably, an acknowledgment of parentage occurs under the Vital
Records Act, 410 ILL. COMP. STAT. 535/12, while an acknowledgment of
paternity occurs under the Public Aid Code, 305 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/10-17.7.
But, 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 45/5(a)(3)-(4) (2004) parentage acknowledgments
seemingly differ from paternity acknowledgments as only the former are tied
to birth certificate practices around the time of birth. See 410 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 535/12(4) (parentage); 305 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/10-17.7 (paternity).
53. Smith, 818 N.E.2d at 1208, n.1 (stating that Romel never amended his
complaint to allege a cause of action on a section 6(d) grounds); see also Brief
of the Plaintiff-Appellee, supra note 49, at *9 (stating that, though Romel
.urged" the trial court to consider "whether his complaint contained an
allegation of fraud," the court ruling was "confined" to to "Section 7(b-5)
relief"); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 45/6(d) (2004) (providing that one who
challenges a voluntary paternity acknowledgment has the burden of proof).
54. Smith, 818 N.E.2d at 1208, n.1 (noting that Romel did not amend his
complaint); see also Brief of the Plaintiff-Appellee, supra note 49, at *9 (stating
that Romel "urged the trial court to consider whether his complaint contained
an allegation of fraud").
55. See Smith, 818 N.E.2d at 1210 (finding that 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/21401(a) was amended at the time section 6(d) was added so as to differentiate
section 6(d) petitions from other postjudgment proceedings).
56. See Smith, 818 N.E.2d at 1212 (noting that the section 6(d) amendment
was "not passed on a whim," but served to bring Illinois law "in line with Title
IV-D of the Social Security Act"). In fact, section 6(d) goes beyond the federal
mandate as it applies the sixty day rule, with its exceptions, to all voluntary
acknowledgments, not just to those involved with federal welfare law (i.e.,
acknowledgments involving children receiving federally-subsidized aid). Cf.,
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paternity of Romel had been established in some other way, as
through a lawsuit involving the dissolution of a marriage between
Romel and Valerie, the sixty day period would not have applied.57
In the aftermath of Smith, Illinois policies on rescissions of
voluntary paternity acknowledgments remain unclear. Can an
erroneous "representation" by an unwed mother like Valerie ever
lead to fraud, duress, or material mistake? If so, what constitutes
a "representation"? Are outright lies (including an "intent" or
"purpose" to "deceive") necessary? After Smith, there will continue
differing policies for Illinois men seeking to disestablish paternity
due to a lack of genetic ties, with the differences dependent upon
the techniques employed for paternity establishment.
Thus,
married men subject to legal paternity through marital
presumptions (as opposed to unmarried men subject to legal
paternity through voluntary acknowledgment presumptions) now
have more than sixty days to seek disestablishment.
Upon
challenge, will the variations between different fathers-in-law who
seek disestablishment due to lack of genetic ties be deemed
reasonable and constitutional? Moreover, is it important that the
state, rather than Valerie (or an alleged genetic father), oppose the
disestablishment request?
While the Illinois Supreme Court did not address fraud in
Romel's case, other Illinois decisions shed some light on how these
guidelines will be read.' In civil cases not involving Section 6(d) of
the Illinois Parentage Act, there are "two types of fraud"59
governing petitions for relief from trial court judgments. Extrinsic
fraud prevents a court from truly acquiring authority, giving it
only colorable jurisdiction. It includes circumstances where "'the
unsuccessful party has been prevented from exhibiting fully his
case... as by keeping him away from court... or where the
defendant never had knowledge of the suit... ,6o Extrinsic fraud
has also been described as "conduct that is collateral to the issues
in the case and.., prevents the unsuccessful party from having a
fair opportunity to participate and defend in the action."61 By
e.g., LA. CIV. CODE ANN. ART. 196 ("Except as otherwise provided in custody,
visitation, and child support cases, the acknowledgment does not create a
presumption in favor of the man who acknowledges the child.").
57. See Smith, 818 N.E.2d at 1210 (mentioning marriage dissolution cases).
Romel, in fact, urged that he had more time under 750 ILL. COMP. STAT.
45/7(b-5) (2004) because he had been "adjudicated" to be the father in a

"judgment" since his voluntary acknowledgment had, by statute, "the same

effect as a judgment." Id. at 1207. Romel lost on that argument. Id.
58. See also 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 45/6(d) (placing "the burden of proof' in a
voluntary paternity acknowledgment challenge upon the "challenging party").
59. Falcon v. Faulkner, 567 N.E.2d 686, 694 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991).
60. See Falcon, 567 N.E.2d at 694-5 (quoting United States v.
Throckmorton, 98 U.S. 61, 65-66 (1878)).
61. Doctor's Assoc. Inc. v. Duree, 745 N.E.2d 1270, 1280 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001).
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contrast, intrinsic fraud occurs after a court has acquired
jurisdiction, as when there is false testimony or concealment.62
Under Illinois precedents, only extrinsic fraud can support a
petition to render a judgment void.' While there is no Illinois
precedent, elsewhere state courts are divided on whether Valerie's
fraud.'
intrinsic
or
extrinsic
constitute
would
acts
Notwithstanding the Smith ruling, the variations on fraud in
procuring a court judgment seem inappropriate in a voluntary
paternity acknowledgment setting. There is no trial judge at the
hospital or at an agency to insure procedural fairness and that the
testimonials of voluntary acknowledgers are trustworthy and
uninhibited, based on real fears of perjury or other sanctions for
lies.6" In fact, rather than using the general standards on fraud for
modifying a judgment (where a judgment is often not even entered
around the time of the voluntary paternity acknowledgment), the
court in Smith could have required the use of the special fraud
standards operative in comparable paternity disestablishment
settings.' For example, many paternity judgments arising after

62. Falcon, 567 N.E.2d at 694 (declaring that a judgment debtor may not
attack a judgment on "grounds that could have been presented.., when the
judgment was rendered").
63. Duree, 745 N.E.2d at 1280.
64. In Florida, for example, the lower appellate courts are divided. See
Parker v. Parker, 916 So. 2d 926 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005) (reviewing other
state cases and agreeing with the majority view that paternity
misrepresentation in a divorce case is a matter of intrinsic fraud, though there
was contrary precedent in the First District Court of Appeal in Florida). But
see Temple v. Archambo, 161 S.W.3d 217 (Tex. 2005) (using an
extrinsic/intrinsic fraud analysis when a former husband sought to
disestablish paternity arising out of an agreed decree from eleven years
earlier; court found no extrinsic fraud, though there was intrinsic fraud, and
former husband lost).
65. In a civil case setting, a de facto paternity acknowledgment can be
made, for example, when a man agrees with woman's allegation that a child is
his genetic offspring. Here, however, there may be lawyers and there surely is
a trial judge overseeing, with that judge often significantly concerned with
truth-seeking (as in marriage dissolution cases involving kids). As well, in
court cases there seemingly would be a more significant fear of perjury,
sanction, or other fallout from lying or misrepresenting than in paper
acknowledgments that occur in hospitals (where there are no governmental
officials), or in agency offices.
66. See, e.g., State ex rel. Loyd v. Lovelady, 840 N.E.2d 1062 (Ohio 2006)
(sustaining the special statutory provisions on rescissions as they do not
infringe on judicial rulemaking powers). Incidentally, the Ohio provision in
Loyd may face new challenges, as it seemingly mandates rescissions of
voluntary paternity acknowledgments after sixty days without fraud or duress
and allows material mistake of fact to encompass men who "did not know"
they lacked genetic ties before acknowledging paternity, without any statutory
indication of time limits or of barriers to rescission caused by the delay in
seeking rescission after learning post-birth of the lack of genetic ties. See
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3119.962(A)(2)(c) (2004).
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court proceedings are founded on defaults or on settlements
regarding genetic fatherhood involving solely statements of alleged
like
voluntary
(and
perhaps
mothers) which,
fathers
acknowledgments, go significantly untested for accuracy or
truthfulness. Illinois legislators should now consider revising the
Smith decision by amending the Illinois statute on voluntary
paternity acknowledgment rescissions.67 In doing so they should
explicitly unify the procedural standards employed for undoing all
comparable paternity concessions, be they in voluntary paternity
acknowledgments, court proceedings, or in agreements on
fatherhood.
Similarly, the substantive Illinois rescission standards
involving either duress or material mistake of fact should be
unified to govern all comparable forms of paternity concessions,
including admissions in parentage or marriage dissolution cases.
As with fraud, the articulated substantive standards on relief from
civil case judgments do not explicitly mention duress or material
mistake of fact' and do not easily translate into paternity
acknowledgment settings.
Other state courts have ruled on similar post-sixty-day
attacks on voluntary paternity acknowledgments founded on a
lack of genetic ties. They demonstrate that there are significant
interstate differences even though all in-hospital and in-agency
acknowledgments are guided by the Social Security Act.69
B. Connecticut
A Connecticut Superior Court ruled in Thompson v. Fulse°
that a February, 2004 motion to reopen a December 4, 1989
Connecticut court judgment based on a voluntary acknowledgment
signed in Florida by Willie Fulse on October 16, 1989,"' about

67. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 45/6(d) (2004). For postjudgment attacks on
paternity designations in circuit court actions, Illinois legislators might
consider a special statutory provision overriding the general provision of 735
ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-1401(a) (2004). See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 19-7-54
(2004).
68. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-1401(a) (2004).
69. Rescission petitions usually are presented in trial court proceedings,
most often by nongenetic fathers seeking paternity disestablishment. These
proceedings can begin as child support claims presented against nongenetic
fathers. Thus, Romel Smith sought to rescind his voluntary acknowledgment
of paternity, dated October 11, 1997, in a proceeding begun on December 3,
1997, by the State of Illinois for child support on behalf of his alleged
daughter, Kendra. Smith, 818 N.E.2d at 1205-07.
70. Thompson v. Fulse, No. FA890605982S, 2004 WL 1832891 (Conn.
Super. Ct., July 6, 2004).
71. Thompson, 2004 WL 1832891, at *1. Willie was in Florida to attend
college, having commenced in the latter part of 1989. Id.
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seven months after the birth of Rishawn Fulse in Connecticut,2
could only be pursued on the basis of "'fraud, duress or material
mistake of fact.., with the burden of proof upon the challenger.' 73
On fraud, the Connecticut court required proof:
(1) a false representation was made as a statement of fact; (2) it was
untrue and known to be untrue by the party making it; (3) it was
made to induce the other party to act upon it; and (4) the other party
did so act upon the false representation to his detriment.74
Willie failed to show fraud because the mother, Andrea Thompson,
did not "intentionally" keep her sexual liaisons with Trevor, her
former boyfriend, from Willie,7 5 although she had told Willie while
she was pregnant that he was the father. Around March of 1990,
Willie learned from Andrea that he "was not Rishawn's father."76
Willie did not then seek rescission of his voluntary paternity
acknowledgment because he thought "the matter had been taken
care of" by Andrea.77 Willie only realized that it had not been
taken care of on April 21, 2003, when he was served with papers to
appear in a Connecticut child support proceeding, seemingly
prompted by Andrea's receipt of state assistance. 78 Before then,
Willie "had some minimal contact" with Rishawn but had never
been asked by Andrea for child support.79 While Willie Fulse failed
to prove fraud, he nevertheless did obtain a Connecticut court
order vacating the paternity acknowledgment due to a "material
mistake of fact.' ° It would seem that Romel Smith was far more
mistaken as to his paternity, but, unlike Willie Fulse, Romel
obtained no rescission.
C. Tennessee
In Tennessee a man can rescind a voluntary paternity
acknowledgment on the basis of extrinsic or intrinsic fraud, as well

72. Id. at *1 (noting that Rishawn was born in Hartford, Connecticut while
the parents "were 17-year-old high school students").
73. Id. at *2 (quoting CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-172 (2005)).
74. Id. at *2. The court also noted the heavy burden of proof, "clear and
satisfactory evidence," more stringent than mere preponderance. Id. (internal
quotation marks omitted).
75. Id. at *3. Andrea, though, "may have failed to disclose." Id.
76. Id. at *1. Willie could not be the genetic father as Rishawn had Sickle
Cell Anemia. Id.
77. Id. at *1.
78. Id.
79. Id. at *2.
80. Id. at *3-5 (finding that, in this "unique" case, Willie's arguments were
"slightly more persuasive, particularly from Rishawn's point of view," as the
child might be helped "from a medical history standpoint" if Trevor was named
legal father; accordingly, the trial court retained jurisdiction and ordered

genetic testing of Andrea, Willie, and Rishawn).

1308

The John Marshall Law Review

[39:1295

as duress or material mistake of fact.81 In Granderson v. Hicks, a
mother, Lisa Stephens Hicks, and a putative father, Larry C.
Granderson, entered in 1986 into "a voluntary consent order of
paternity" in a paternity case involving Myisha Stephens, then
about four months old. 2 In 1997, Larry sought to set aside related
paternity and child support orders, or, in the alternative, to
require blood tests after Lisa sought an increase in child support.
The basis for Larry's request was that Lisa had told another man
that he was Myisha's father and had "openly held out to others
that the third party [was] Myisha's father."' The trial court
denied the request without an evidentiary hearing.
An appeals court reversed,' initially noting a Tennessee
statute allowing a trial court in any civil proceeding wherein there
is a "'question of parentage'" to order, when "'equitable,'" testing
"'for purposes of establishing or disproving parentage.'"5 Yet it
also said that this statute "must be construed along with" the
statutory provisions for undoing voluntary paternity acknowledgments," which may be challenged for fraud, duress, or
mistake within five years, 87 or beyond five years where there is
"fraud in the procurement of the acknowledgment by the mother"
and "'the requested relief will not affect the interest of the child,
the state, or any Title IV-D agency."'" In reversing, the appeals
court concluded that an evidentiary hearing should have been
ordered on the allegation of "fraud in the procurement of the
Consent Order. ' Thus, in Tennessee, there may be comparable
paternity fraud standards applied to concessions in Title IV-D
acknowledgments and in civil cases.
In Tennessee, the
requirement as to fraud varies depending upon how long ago it
occurred and whether the government fisc will be impacted.
The ruling in Granderson was relied upon in the 2005

Tennessee decision of State v. Wilson.

There, Cedrick Cortez

Wilson sought, in December 2003, "to rescind his voluntary
legitimation of [his] child," Cortarius Tyrez Taylor, born in 1999.'
He did not seek a similar remedy regarding Cedric Cortez Wilson,
Jr., born in 1995. Both boys were born to Brandi Shantika Taylor
and were determined to be Cedrick's sons under a February, 2002
81. TENN. CODE ANN. § 24-7-118(e) (2003).
82. No. 02A01-9801-JV-00007, 1998 WL 886559, at *1 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec.
17, 1998).
83. Granderson,1998 WL 886559, at *1.
84. Id. at *4.
85. Id. at *2 (quoting TENN. CODE ANN. § 24-7-112(a)(2) (2003)).

86. Id. at *4.

87. Id. at *3 (citing TENN. CODE 24-7-118(e)(1)-(2)).
88. Id. (quoting TENN. CODE 24-7-118(e)(2)).

89. Id. at *4.

90. State v. Wilson, No. W2004-00275-COA-R3-JV, 2005 WL 517548, at *34 (Tenn. Ct. App. March 3, 2005).
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Juvenile Court order.9' The rescission request to end Cedrick's
child support obligations to Cortarius was prompted when Brandi
informed Cedrick "there was a possibility that he was not the
father."92 A trial court denied the petition to disestablish paternity
in June, 2003. It recognized custody of both boys in Cedrick, who
then took the boys "to his home in California." He later had
testing of both boys done that confirmed genetic ties only between
Cedrick and Cedrick, Jr.93 Cortarius was returned to Brandi in
July, 2003.
In December, 2003, Cedrick filed "a Petition to Rescind
Voluntary Legitimation" of Cortarius as well as a request to
modify related custody and support orders.94 On January 9, 2004,
this petition was dismissed by the trial court. On January 22,
2004, Brandi sought custody of Cortarius based on DNA testing
showing a lack of genetic ties between him and Cedrick.9" Cedrick
appealed the dismissal, urging that a Tennessee civil procedure
rule allowed him to obtain relief from the February, 2002 order.'
The rule allows relief "within a reasonable time" when "'it is no
longer equitable that a judgment should have prospective
application.' 97
The appeals court granted Cedrick's rescission petition after
"analyzing the burdens ...on all who have an interest," which it
said included Cedrick, Brandi, Cortarius, and the State of
Tennessee." Interestingly, when it ruled, Brandi and Cortarius
were likely living in Mississippi,9 and Cedrick (and Cedrick Jr.)
apparently were living in California. The interest analysis was
undertaken against a backdrop of several Tennessee cases,
including Granderson, which "strongly" established the state
policy "favoring the requiring of biological parents to bear
responsibility for their own children.""° In ruling that the trial
court "abused its discretion in failing to grant relief to Mr.
Wilson,"'' the appellate court revealed the "suggestion in the
record" that the genetic father of Cortarius was then "incarcerated
in Oklahoma." 2 It also found it "unlikely" that the existing
relationships between Cortarius and the two Cedricks would be
91. Id.
92. Id.

93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

Id.
Id.
Id.
See Id. at *2 (referencing TENN. R. Civ. P. 60.02).
Id. (quoting TENN. R. CIV. P. 60.02(4)).
Id. at *4.

99. See Id. at *1 (relying on a suggestion in the briefs regarding the
residence of Brandi and Cortarius).

100. Id. at *4-5.
101. Id. at *5.
102. Id.
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severed as Cortarius still had a "half-brother," Cedric Jr., who was

fathered by Cedrick, Sr."' While using Granderson, the Wilson
court seemingly did distinguish out-of-court and in-court
acknowledgments, with the latter at times more easily rescinded
since Title IV-D mandates do not technically apply (though the
Granderson court found them helpful in construing state public
policy).
D. New York
The New York voluntary paternity acknowledgment statute
declares that sixty days after signing, a father "may challenge the
acknowledgment of paternity in court only on the basis of fraud,
duress, or material mistake of fact, with the burden of proof on the
party challenging the voluntary acknowledgment. "1°u The statute
further says that upon receiving a challenge
to an
acknowledgment, "the court shall order genetic marker tests or
DNA tests for the determination of the child's paternity and shall
make a finding of paternity, if appropriate." 5 In a 1999 case,
Wilson v. Lumb, a trial judge required "genetic marker tests or
DNA tests"" on behalf of a man who had signed a voluntary
acknowledgment shortly after birth and more than sixty days
earlier, but who later "became suspicious of the child's
parentage."' °7 The challenge came during a proceeding in which
the man was sued for child support." While ruling that genetic
testing should precede any "hearing on fraud, duress or material
mistake of fact,"0 9 the trial court noted the "lack of case precedent"
on the statute, "which may not be clearly worded.""' It also noted
the absence of any express direction that the best interests of the
child be considered before testing is ordered."' It further opined
103. Id.
104. N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 516-a(b) (McKinney 2005).
105. Id.
106. 696 N.Y.S.2d 398, 401 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1999).
107. See id. at 399 (noting that "sometime later" suspicion arose when
relatives told the man and/or his mother that "he might not be the baby's
father," and when a letter was found addressed to the mother about 9 months
before the baby's birth).
108. Id.
109. Id. at 401. Cf Hammack v. Hammack, 737 N.Y.S.2d 702 (N.Y. App.
Div. 2002) (finding that a different New York statute, N.Y. FAMILY COURT ACT
§ 418(a) (McKinney 2005), was applicable when a divorced man sought to undo
paternity established during an earlier marriage dissolution proceeding for
children born during marriage; § 418(a) was read to require denial of
requested testing when not in children's best interests).
110. Wilson, 696 N.Y.S.2d at 400.
111. Id. at 401 (opining that perhaps legislators thought "active
misrepresentation or wrongdoing" by a mother is enough "justification" for
rescission). But see Melissa B. v. Robert W.R., 803 N.Y.S.2d 672 (N.Y. App.
Div. 2005) (presenting a contrary analysis to Wilson on both the pretest need
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that while "blood test results" alone do not always "establish
biological parentage,"112 voluntary paternity acknowledgments may
be "more easily set aside" with such test results than certain court
orders of filiation, including court orders accompanied by "stricter,
more comprehensive" waivers of rights.113 Thus, like the Wilson
court in Tennessee, the Lumb court in New York recognized
paternity acknowledgments by nongenetic fathers, though the
New York court focused on voluntariness rather than o biology and
viewed more warily requests for rescissions of acknowledgments.""
E.

Oklahoma

In a case reminiscent of Romel Smith's, an Oklahoma
appellate court ruled on a rescission plea by Billy J. Chisum, who
sought disestablishment of a voluntary paternity acknowledgment
signed on the date of a child's birth, June 7, 1999, and used in a
2000 administrative child support order."' Chisum proferred the
rescission request in April, 2001 after completing private testing
prompted by the mother's statement that "Chisum was not the
father.""6 The appellate court avoided difficult issues regarding
fraud, finding there was a "material mistake of fact" even though
Chisum could have insisted on genetic testing before his
acknowledgment." 7 It found no "neglect" by Chisum in failing to
act on testing."' It reasoned that any testing at birth prompted by
Chisum "would likely inject an element of hostility into.., often
times already volatile emotional relationships," would be
"expensive," and may prompt unfortunate perceptions about "an

for a hearing on fraud, duress, or mistake, and on the best interests of
children).
112. Wilson, 696 N.Y.S.2d at 400 (citing Clara C. v. William L., 692 N.Y.S.2d
569, 578-79 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1999)); see also Charles v. Charles, 745 N.Y.S.2d
572 (N.Y. App. Div. 2002) (notwithstanding a lack of genetic ties, a man may
be a legal father if a child's best interests are served).
113. Wilson, 696 N.Y.S.2d at 401 (citing Ulster Cty. Dept. of Soc. Serv. v.
Wilbert D., 145 Misc. 2d 362, 363 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1989)). Of course, there may
not be such "stricter" waivers in filiation proceedings if the cases are simply
based on previous acknowledgments of paternity. See Mark D. v. Marion M.,
785 N.Y.S.2d 204, 205 (N.Y. App. Div. 2004) (diverging from the Wilson case in
that the acknowledged father seeking disestablishment proceeded on a motion
for relief from a filiation judgment that he himself pursued eight years earlier,

arguing "newly-discovered evidence" of infertility under N.Y. C.P.L.R.
5015(a)(2) (McKinney 2005); the father lost without any court ordered DNA or
other testing).
114. Wilson, 696 N.Y.S.2d at 400-01.

115. Dep't. of Human Servs. v. Chisum, 85 P.3d 860, 861 (Okl. Civ. App.

2004). Notably, the administrative order was "docketed" in a trial court in
May 2000. Id.
116. Chisum, 85 P.3d at 861, n.1.
117. Id. at 862 (citing OKLA. STAT. tit. 10 § 70 (2005)).

118. Id. at 862.
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attack on the mother's veracity and an attempt to shirk responsibility for the child." ' 19
The court's rule seemingly facilitates attacks on paternity
acknowledgments by mistaken nongenetic fathers regardless of
how the mistakes arose. In doing so, it rejected arguments about
the applicability of a best interests of the child, or an equitable
estoppel analysis. 2 ° Further, it encouraged the current male
partners of unwed new mothers to take on parentage by opening
the door widely to rescissions once the partnerships end and
genetic ties are found lacking.
F. Louisiana
In Louisiana, the standards on rescinding voluntary paternity
acknowledgments are quite different in that they vary depending
upon whether and when the acknowledging man was a husband of
the mother and whether or not TANF services were in play. In
Faucheux v. Faucheux, 21 a Louisiana appeals court ruled in
October 2000 on an attempt by Ray Faucheux to void a paternity
acknowledgment due to "fraud and duress." The acknowledgment
covered Carley, a daughter born to Amy Faucheux before Ray and
One relevant statute said that an
Amy even met."'
acknowledgment may be rescinded more than sixty days after the
signing, but only if it "was induced by fraud, duress, or material
mistake of fact, or that the father is not the biological father."'
Another provided "for the acknowledgment of an illegitimate child
by authentic act,""' 4 and another said "'every claim, set up by
illegitimate children, may be contested by those who have any
interest therein.''12' Given these laws, the appeals court found
that "there is no prescriptive period for filing an action to rescind
an acknowledgment,""' 6 and that an acknowledgment usually
cannot 1be valid where the acknowledging man is not the biological
father. '
119. Id. at 862 & n.2. Such testing would be problematic "at least where
there is evidence that the mother has made positive assertions to the putative

father concerning his paternity"). Id. at 862.

120. Id. at 862-63. The court, though, noted that some precedents outside
Oklahoma support such approaches, including Monmouth Cty. Div. of Soc.
Serv. v. R.K, 757 A.2d 319, 324 (N.J.Super. 2000). See also Young v.
Oklahoma, 119 P.3d 1279, 1286 n.10 (Okl. Civ. App. 2005) (asserting that
under Chisum rescissions rescissionof paternity acknowledgments used for
child support orders are guided by OKLA. STAT. tit. 10 § 70 rather than by the
statutory standards for reopening final judgments).
121. 772 So. 2d 237 (La. Ct. App. 2000).
122. Faucheux, 772 So. 2d at 238.
123. Id. (quoting LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:392(7)(b) (2005)).
124. Id. (describing then LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 203 (2005)).
125. Id. (quoting then LA. CIV. CODE Ann. art. 207 (2005)).

126. Id.

127. See id. (referencing then LA. CIV. CODE ANN. arts. 193-97, 203, to show
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The Faucheux court cited to Rousseve v. Jones,128 a 1997
Louisiana Supreme Court decision, which opined that an
acknowledgment of an illegitimate child, executed in connection
with a Title IV proceeding,19 only creates a presumption of
biological parentage which can be overridden whenever genetic
ties are lacking, "absent some overriding concern of public
policy." 3 ° When such an acknowledgment forms the basis of a
court judgment for child support, the Rousseve court recognized
that Louisiana law then allowed an attack on the judgment if
procured "by fraud or ill practice ... within a year of the discovery
of the fraud or ill practice." 3 ' By contrast, the Rousseve court also
noted that an action to disavow paternity by a man who was at
some point in time the husband of the mother "generally must be
filed within 180 days after the husband has learned.., of the
birth of the child."'32 Yet, where such a husband "believed, because
of misrepresentation, fraud, or deception by the mother, that he
was the father of the child, then the time for filing suit for
disavowal of paternity shall be suspended during the period of
such erroneous belief or for ten years, whichever ends first."
Because unwed Matthew Rousseve had not yet proven his
allegations, "that he had just become aware of fraud or
misrepresentation by the child's mother"'34 when he sought
paternity disavowal, the high court remanded the case to the trial
court for a hearing.'35 Clearly, though, because Matthew had
never been married to the mother, he had more time to "sit on" his
newfound discovery of nonpaternity (one year) than he would have
had if he were a married man (180 days). As well, it was only a
suggestion (or dictum) by the high court in Rousseve that a
voluntary paternity acknowledgment unprompted by a court
proceeding can be rescinded whenever no genetic ties are found.
Perhaps the earlier-described Title IV federal guidelines on such
rescissions express an "overriding concern of public policy"'36 that
that the word filiation describes the fact of biological parentage).
128. Id.

129. Rousseve v. Jones, 704 So. 2d 229, 230 (La. 1997).
130. Id. at 232-33. The court, however, did not explore any possible public
policy exceptions.
131. Id. at 233 (citing LA. CODE CIV. PRoc. ANN. art. 2004 (2005)).
132. Id. at 231 & n.4 (citing LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 189 (2005)).
133. Id. at 231 (citing LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:305 (2005)); see also LA. CIv.
CODE art. 198 (2005) (providing that an action to establish paternity of a child

presumed to be the child of another man shall be instituted within a year of
birth, but up to ten years when the "mother in bad faith deceived" the genetic
father); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:395.1 (2005) (establishing that the time period
does "not apply to the Department of Social Services providing services in

accordance with 42 U.S.C. 666").

134. Rousseve, 704 So. 2d at 230.

135. Id. at 233.

136. Today, some statutes differentiate at times perhaps between voluntary
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disallows easy rebuttals of presumed genetic ties arising with inhospital and in-agency Title IV paternity acknowledgments. This
analysis, however, was not undertaken in Faucheux.
G. Summary
There is disagreement among state courts over the fraud,
duress, or material mistake of fact that can undo in-hospital and
in-agency voluntary paternity acknowledgments."' Five years to
act, ten years to act, no real time limit on action? Is there a
"material mistake" whenever a man is wrong about genetic ties,
though there is no fraud? Should "neglect" to seek earlier testing
be relevant, even though "hostility" and attacks on mothers'
veracity will be encouraged? Should the Title IV-D agency's
interests be considered when determining whether rescission can
be pursued?
The cases reflect differing treatment of similarly-situated
men, and of others involved in certain paternity disestablishments. Decreasing inequality and advancing uniformity
are significant federal governmental interests that should prompt
In their
serious reconsideration of federal law standards.'"
absence, proposed "uniform" standards available to state
legislators would be helpful.'39 Unifying federal standards, of
paternity acknowledgments related (Rousseve) and unrelated (Faucheux) to
Title IV proceedings. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:392(A)(7)(b) (2005)
(providing that an attempt after sixty day's to rescind a paternity
acknowledgment may be based on absence of genetic ties, as well as "fraud,
duress, or material mistake of fact"); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:392(B) (requiring
that, in addition to Civil Code requirements, paternity acknowledgments must
be in compliance with 42 U.S.C. 652(a)(7)); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:395.1
(providing that the generally applicable time period does not apply to the
Department of Social Services acting under 42 U.S.C. 666).
137. See Paula Roberts, Truth or Consequences: Part III. Who Pays When
Paternity Is Disestablished?, 37 FAM. L.Q. 69, 82 app. B (2003) (assemblind
and briefly describing state statutory provisions on rescinding voluntary
paternity acknowledgments).
138. Federal law standards would also obviate troubling choice of law issues
where relevant conduct occurred in several states. See, e.g., In re Adoption of
Colette Lichtenberg, No. CA2002-11-125, 2003 WL 868306 (Ohio Ct. App.
March 5, 2003) (describing uncertainty regarding whether Indiana or Ohio law
applied to conduct of genetic father in an Ohio adoption case where child was
born in Indiana to Indiana parents, but where an Indiana adoption agency
placed the child with a prospective adoption couple in Ohio a few days after
birth).
139. The available forms of the Uniform Parentage Act fail to provide
sufficient guidance. For example, the 1973 Act only recognizes that a
voluntary paternity acknowledgment (which initially need not be accompanied
by the mother's consent) can prompt a presumption of natural fatherhood that
may be rebutted by "clear and convincing evidence" and may be overcome by a
man who also has presumed natural father status, as via a marriage where
"weightier considerations of public policy and logic control." UNIF. PARENTAGE
ACT § 4(a)(5), 4(b) (1973); see also UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT prefatory note (1973)
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course, would mean that individual states could no longer balance
for themselves the competing interests, including: the desirability
of more certainty in initial paternity designations; a continuation
of the strong correlations between actual genetic ties and legal
paternity; the problems with consents to paternity that are
uninformed or founded on lies; and, the benefits of recognizing
legal paternity for men who have actually parented children from
birth. Even without preemptive federal standards or uniform
state law proposals, many individual states seemingly could do
better in balancing the competing interests when addressing
fraud, duress, and material mistake of fact in voluntary
acknowledgment settings. In Illinois, legislative or common law
initiatives are needed in order to eliminate the uncertainties
arising from the decision in the Smith case. General Assembly
action is preferable. In addressing fraud, duress, and material
mistake of fact standards, legislators should also consider related
substantive and procedural issues: repose (no rescission beyond a
certain time); standing (i.e., who can sue to rescind, or to establish
a parent-child relationship which would necessarily undo a
voluntary paternity acknowledgment); and, when, if ever, a child's
best interests might foreclose rescission of a voluntary paternity
acknowledgment by a nongenetic father.
As suggested in Granderson, fraud, duress, or material
mistake of fact may also be used to disestablish legal paternity due
to a lack of genetic ties where there was an earlier admission of
paternity, but no earlier in-hospital or in-agency voluntary
paternity acknowledgment. Of course, legal paternity designations
do not always require admissions, acknowledgments, or the like, of
genetic ties by the men deemed fathers under the law. The
following section explores Illinois statutes and precedents relating
to other means of establishing and disestablishing legal paternity,
demonstrating that again there are troubling differences between
similarly-situated men.
III. ILLINOIS STANDARDS RELATING TO OTHER PATERNITY
DISESTABLISHMENTS

Beyond in-hospital voluntary acknowledgments by men like
("All presumptions of paternity are rebuttable in appropriate circumstances.").
The 2000 Uniform Parentage Act simply provides that "[a]fter the period for
rescission under Section 307 has expired, a signatory of an acknowledgment of
paternity or denial of paternity may commence a proceeding to challenge the
acknowledgment or denial" on the basis of "fraud, duress or material mistake

of fact," but fails to define "fraud, duress or material mistake."

UNIF.

PARENTAGE ACT § 308 (2000); see also PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY
DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 3.03(d) (2000) (noting that
legal paternity (and its disestablishment by a married man) "is a matter
outside the scope" of the Principles).
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Romel Smith, there are many other ways to establish legal
paternity in Illinois.
Similarly, there are many ways to
disestablish legal paternity beyond rescission. Other establishment and disestablishment standards often vary greatly from the
standards applicable to Title IV-D in-hospital and in-agency
voluntary acknowledgments.
In Illinois, legal paternity can arise: from acknowledgments
(or admissions, concessions, or the like) occurring outside of
hospitals or agencies; from adjudicatory proceedings in and out of
the general jurisdiction trial courts; and, from such conduct as
marrying, actual parenting, or contracting. 4 ° Genetic ties with a
child do not always assure a man a real chance of legal parentage,
even where the mother never married. As the United States
Supreme Court observed:
Parental rights do not spring full-blown from the biological
connection between parent and child. They require relationships
more enduring. The mother carries and bears the child, and in this
sense her parental relationship is clear. The validity of the father's
parental claims must be gauged by other measures. By tradition,
the primary measure has been the legitimate familial relationship
he creates with the child by marriage with the mother .... In some
circumstances the actual relationship between father
4 and child may
suffice to create in the ... father parental interests.1 1
The lack of paternity rights under law for a genetically-tied man
does not necessarily mean that he cannot be assessed parental
responsibilities, even long after birth. Often, even though genetic
fathers have lost or abandoned the parental opportunity interests
recognized by the U.S. Supreme Court, mothers, children, state
agencies, or perhaps others can establish their paternity in order
to secure money for child support or child support
reimbursement.'
Here, no meaningful father-child relationships
may ever be contemplated.
140. While contracts between genetic mothers and nongenetic fathers can
lead to paternity, similar contracts usually cannot end paternity, even for
genetic fathers. See, e.g., Kristine M. v. David P., No. A109655, 2006 WL
74129 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 13, 2006).

141. Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 397 (1974).
142. When child support is secured through a legal paternity designation
against a genetic dad who earlier lost parental opportunities that were or may
have been available, it is unclear whether such a man has a constitutionallyprotected right to child visitation or custody, even assuming that a best
interests test might also apply. See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Parness, Old-Fashioned
Pregnancy,Newly-Fashioned Paternity, 53 SYRACUSE L. REV. 57, 82-83 (2003)
("[LIawmakers should also consider more seriously the circumstances

appropriate for 'revived' legal paternity.").

Here there would be no

retroactivity since the genetic father would obtain legal fatherhood effective
only at some time after birth, perhaps when child support is first ordered and
where paternal childrearing rights from that time on serve the child's best
interests.
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Paternity disestablishments founded on a lack of genetic ties
can be pursued not only by nongenetic fathers (like Romel Smith),
but also by mothers, children, and state agencies (like Valerie
Dawson, Kendra Smith, and the Department of Healthcare &
Family Services (formerly the Illinois Department of Public Aid)).
For the varying pursuers, the legal standards can differ. As well,
the standards can differ for the same pursuers depending upon the
technique employed to establish paternity.
Applicable standards on paternity establishment and
disestablishment in Illinois may involve such considerations as:
timing, state-of-mind, a child's best interests, the existence of an
intact marriage, and state-supported financial assistance. The
standards may originate from several lawmakers, including
legislators, administrative agency officials, and judges.
The following sections briefly review Illinois paternity
establishment standards and their related disestablishment
It begins with a closer review of the voluntary
standards.
acknowledgment laws at play for Romel Smith and then explores
other techniques for establishing legal paternity (whether or not
driven by the Social Security Act). The results demonstrate some
disturbing distinctions.
A. In-Hospital Voluntary Acknowledgments
In Illinois, under the Illinois Parentage Act, a parent and
child relationship may be "established" voluntarily by the "signing
and witnessing" of a voluntary acknowledgment of paternity at a
If the mother
hospital in accordance with the Vital Records Act.
of the child was not married to the alleged father at either the
time of conception or birth, the name of the father is entered on
the birth certificate only if the mother and the alleged father have
signed a voluntary acknowledgment of parentage.'" In the event
that the mother was married at the time of conception or birth and
the mother's husband is not the genetic father, the alleged genetic
father is entered on the birth certificate only if he and the mother
sign a voluntary acknowledgment of paternity, and if the mother
and her husband (a presumed father under law) sign a denial of
the husband's paternity. 4' Such a voluntary acknowledgment
means the signing "man is presumed to be the natural father"4 '
and usually "conclusively establishes a parent and child

143. See 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 45/6(a) (2004) (Illinois Parentage Act of 1984);
410 ILL. COMP. STAT. 535/12 (2004) (Vital Records Act). At times the relevant
statutes use the phrase voluntary "acknowledgment of parentage," as in
sections 5(a)(4) and 6(a) of the Parentage Act.
144. 410 ILL. COMP. STAT. 535/12(4), (5)(a).
145. Id.
146. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 45/5(a)(3) (2004).
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relationship.""7 With such a voluntary acknowledgment, neither a
judicial nor an administrative proceeding is required."'
Notwithstanding its "conclusive" status, as permitted by the
Social Security Act, such a voluntary acknowledgment usually
may be easily rescinded within sixty days. 49 Similarly, it may be
challenged after sixty days "on the basis of fraud, duress or
material mistake of fact,"" the standard that was applicable to
Romel Smith.
B. In-Agency Voluntary Acknowledgments
Paternity may also be established in Illinois through a
statutory form of voluntary acknowledgment that involves a
presumption, but not conduct at a hospital or other location where
birth occurs."' Under the Vital Records Act,"' a "local registrar or
county clerk after the birth shall" provide the opportunity for
genetic parents married or unmarried to each other "to sign an
acknowledgment of parentage"" on a form supplied by the Illinois
Department of Public Aid." As with a voluntary acknowledgment
in a hospital, here too there is a presumption that the signing man
is "the natural father.""' The "signing and witnessing of the
acknowledgment of parentage ... conclusively establishes a parent
and child relationship."16
An in-agency acknowledgment may only be rescinded in the
way that an in-hospital acknowledgment (such as the one
completed by Romel Smith) may be rescinded, meaning that fraud,
147. 410 ILL. COMP. STAT. 535/12(4), 5(a); see also 750 ILL. COMP. STAT.
45/5(b) (providing that the presumption is generally "conclusive"). But see 750

ILL. COMP. STAT. 45/5(b) (providing that if a minor signs a paternity

acknowledgment, the presumption is conclusive six "months after the minor
reaches majority or is otherwise emancipated").
148. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 45/6(c) (2004).

149. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 45/5(b)(1).
150. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 45/6(d).

151. See, e.g., 410 ILL. COMP. STAT. 535/12(4), (5) (placing responsibilities for

registering a live birth to an unmarried woman, or to a married woman where
her husband is not the "biological father" at the time of birth, on "the
institution" where birth occurred, and "after birth" on the "local register or
county clerk").

152. 410 ILL. COMP. STAT. 535/1-29; see also 305 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/10-17.7
(2004) (providing for administrative parentage determinations for those "given
access to child support enforcement services" under the Illinois Public Aid
Code).

153. 410 ILL. COMP. STAT. 535/12(5)(a)(i)-(ii). The statute requires that, "if
the presumed father is not the biological father, an opportunity for the mother
and presumed father to sign a denial of paternity" be provided. 410 ILL.

COMP. STAT. 535/12(5)(a)(ii).
154. 410 ILL. COMP. STAT. 535/12(5)(a).
155. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 45/5(a)(4).
156. 410 ILL. COMP. STAT. 535/12(5)(a); see also 750 ILL. COMP. STAT.
45/5(a)(4), (b) (providing for acknowledgment under the Vital Records Act).
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duress or material mistake of fact are needed after sixty days."'
While in-hospital and in-agency acknowledgments are similar in
many respects, it seems that only the latter must be available
under written laws to unmarried couples not involved with public
aid or state child support services, though both forms are in fact
usually made available to all unmarried couples. 1"
C. Common Law Voluntary Acknowledgments
Besides Vital Records and Public Aid Code voluntary
paternity acknowledgments, there is Illinois precedent for at least
one
form
of
common
law
(nonstatutory)
voluntary
acknowledgment that prompts a similar presumption of natural
fatherhood. 9 In Jackson v. Newsome, 6 ' an Illinois appellate court
found in 2001 that Anthony Newsome had signed and
acknowledged paternity in an agreed order dated January 22,
1992, and entered in a parentage case brought by Elma Jackson on
December 6, 1991.161 In seeking to disestablish his paternity of
Alecia Jackson, born December 17, 1989, Anthony sued Elma in
February, 2000.162
The appellate court held that his
acknowledgment was comparable to an acknowledgment filed with
a local registrar or a county clerk under the Vital Records Act'"
and thus similarly prompted a presumption of natural fatherhood
under the Parentage Act.'6 The court then said Anthony could
seek to undo the acknowledgment under a provision of the
Parentage Act allowing a suit to declare the non-existence of a
parent-child relationship through DNA tests since there had been

157. See 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 45/5(b) (sixty day limit to rescind generally);
410 ILL. COMP. STAT. 535/12(7) ("fraud, duress or material mistake of fact,"

with no set time limit).

158. Compare 305 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/10-17.7 (in-agency), with 410 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 535/12(5) (in-hospital and in-agency).
Anecdotal evidence

gathered by the author in a 2005 survey of Illinois birthing facilities suggests
that Illinois hospital personnel offer in-hospital acknowledgment opportunities

to all unwed heterosexual couples whether or not governmental aid has been
or will be provided. The survey results are on file with the author.
159. The Illinois Supreme Court has already recognized a common-law
paternity claim involving an unwed man's actual consent to artificial
insemination even though there was no compliance with the Illinois Parentage
Act guidelines on children conceived artificially by married couples. In re
Parentage of M.J., 787 N.E.2d 144 (Ill. 2003).
160. 758 N.E.2d 342 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001).
161. Jackson, 758 N.E.2d at 344.
162. Id. Before suing, Anthony sought post-judgment relief in Elma's
parentage case in December 1997 (as well as an order for "blood testing" in
May 1997), but lost in April 1998. Id. at 344-45.
163. See id. at 348 (noting that the only differences involved "minute and
ministerial technical requirements").
164. Id. at 349 (citing 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 45/7(b-5) (2004)).
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an earlier "adjudication of paternity," as required by the Act."'
DNA testing was completed in December 29, 1998.'6
This statutory provision on a declaration of no parent-child
relationship was available for Anthony's use as long as he acted
within two years of obtaining "knowledge of relevant facts," a
period that would toll during the time "the natural mother or the
child refuses to submit" to DNA tests.'67 This same provision was
unavailable to Romel Smith as his acknowledgment had not been
accompanied by any "adjudication of paternity."" But for Valerie
Dawson's poverty, and thus reliance on public aid, perhaps Romel
Smith would have only acknowledged paternity when sued for
support; like Anthony Newsome, he then probably would have
been able to seek disestablishment, since he would have acted
within two years of learning he was not Kendra's genetic father.
The Jackson precedent suggests that other common law forms
of voluntary acknowledgments are also possible. The Jackson
ruling can be quite reasonably read to recognize in-court
acknowledgments during not only paternity establishment cases
involving unwed couples, but also during dissolution cases as long
as the in-agency acknowledgment procedures of the Vital Records
Act are followed. Stretched a bit further (but not unreasonably),
the Jackson decision suggests that in-hospital acknowledgments
should be available to individuals who are not involved with public
aid or state child support services, as long as Public Aid Code
procedures are followed. 9
Finally, the Jackson precedent may
even allow other forms of common law voluntary paternity
acknowledgments (outside of hospitals, agencies, and courts). For
example, acknowledgments in lawyer's offices might be legally
binding as long as accompanied by fair (i.e., Vital Record Act)
procedures.

165. Id.
166. Id. at 351.
167. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 45/8(a)(4) (2004). The court in Jackson found that
Anthony had acted within two years because his "knowledge of relevant
events" only arose when he completed the DNA tests, not when he first asked
a court to order tests. Jackson, 758 N.E.2d at 351. This decision rested, in
part, on the proposition that Anthony could not begin a disestablishment

proceeding without DNA tests. Id. at 351-52.

This proposition is now in

doubt. See John M., 817 N.E.2d at 506 (reading 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 45/11(a)
to permit a court, upon filing a petition to establish parentage, to order DNA
testing, and requiring the court to do so upon request of a party).
168. Smith, 818 N.E.2d at 1207.

169. A 2005 survey by the author of Illinois birthing facilities shows that in-

hospital acknowledgment services are made available to all unmarried
mothers. Results of this survey are on file with the author.

20061

PaternityDisestablishmentLaw in Illinois

1321

D. Birth Certificates
Legal paternity, at least for some purposes, can still be
recognized in Illinois for a man who was simply designated as the
father on a birth certificate (with no accompanying voluntary
acknowledgment). An amendment to such a certificate then can
disestablish parentage under law as of the time of birth, divesting
the earlier-named man of whatever legal rights or responsibilities
accompanied the birth certificate designation. However, far from
all birth certificates issued in Illinois during the last century
address completely the legal parentage of a child born in Illinois as
7
of the time of birth."'
Many children born in Illinois never have a
birth certificate designating legal paternity,' though it is rare for
a child born to have no such certificate designating maternity
(motherhood as of the time of birth).' 2
Notably, the disestablishment of the paternity of an earliernamed man with no genetic ties through a birth certificate
amendment relating back to the time of birth'73 does not mean that
the genetic father, some other man, or some other intended parent
(i.e., a woman) will be substituted. There need not be at some
point two parents (one being the birth mother) recognized under
law for a single child as of the time of birth.
For about a decade, birth certificate designations in Illinois
have only reaffirmed, and not themselves established, legal
paternity for either married or unmarried genetic fathers.
Married men usually are automatically presumed fathers, even
when they go unnamed on birth certificates, so that naming them
adds little.'74 Unmarried men, since August 9, 1996, can only be
170. See, e.g, 410 ILL. COMP. STAT. 535/12(4) (2004) (establishing that the
name of the father of a child born to an unmarried mother may "be entered on
the child's birth certificate only if the mother and the person to be named the
father have signed an acknowledgment of parentage").
171. See, e.g., 410 ILL. COMP. STAT. 535/14 ("[The] birth of a person in
Illinois, whose birth is not registered, may [not must] be recorded by delayed
registration.. . ."); ILL. ADM. CODE tit. 77, § 500.10 (2004) (defining "[d]elayed
birth registration" to mean registration three days after the event).
172. But see 410 ILL. COMP. STAT. 535/14 (recognizing that an unrecorded

birth is possible).

173. Of course, legal paternity can be disestablished and a birth certificate

amended effective sometime after birth, as when a birth certificate is amended

so as to recognize an adoption of a child whose legal father as of the time of
birth has had his parental rights ended voluntarily or involuntarily. See 410
ILL. COMP. STAT. 535/17(1)(a).
174. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 45/5(a)(1), (2) (2004). This includes men married
at time of conception or birth, or married thereafter, as long as the man is
named on the birth certificate. Id. As to the latter, this marital presumption
may be superfluous as it is unclear whether a birth certificate can name a
later-married man without an acknowledgment of paternity, since an
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included on birth certificates of children born to unmarried women
if they earlier signed acknowledgments of parentage, 5 which are
"conclusive" of natural fatherhood and thus of legal paternity. 176
Before August 9, 1996, however, under Illinois statute, a birth
certificate for a child born to an unmarried woman seemingly
could itself establish legal paternity. No earlier acknowledgments
were necessary and a man could be named on a birth certificate
7
simply with his consent and the written consent of the mother. 1
Before July 28, 1993, a putative genetic father could even more
easily establish legal paternity through signing a birth certificate.
Back then, the relevant statute did not expressly require maternal
consent.
It also demanded that birthing facility personnel
responsible "for preparing and filing the birth certificate"
undertake "a reasonable effort to obtain the signatures of both
78
parents.""
Any new disestablishments of birth certificate paternity
established prior to 1996 on the grounds of a lack of genetic ties
undoubtedly will be rare.
Should such an initiative be
undertaken, the most likely vehicle would be either an amendment
to the birth certificate that excludes the named father" 9 or a civil
action to declare the existence (e.g., on behalf of another man), 80 or
the nonexistence (e.g., for the named father)18' of a parent-child
relationship. After 1996, many, but perhaps not all,
disestablishments sought by mothers or fathers of the legal
paternity recognized through the birth certificates of children born
to unwed mothers will be guided chiefly by the aforedescribed
federal disestablishment standards on in-hospital voluntary
acknowledgments. Yet, given that these significant requirements,
acknowledgment seemingly is required when a then unmarried man is to be

named on the certificate under 410 ILL. COMP. STAT. 535/12(4), an
acknowledgment that prompts its own presumption, see 750 ILL. COMP. STAT.
45/5(a)(3), (4). Moreover, married men may not be the presumed fathers, as
where births stem from artificial insemination undertaken outside the
statutory standards. See 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 45/6(a)(1).
175. See 410 ILL. COMP. STAT. 535/12(4) (effective August 9, 1996).
176. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 45/5(b). While conclusive, under some conditions
an acknowledgment may be "rescinded." Id.
177. See 410 ILL. COMP. STAT. 535/12(4) (1995) (amended 1996).
178. 410 ILL. COMP. STAT. 535/12(4) (1992) (amended 1993).
179. See, e.g., 410 ILL. COMP. STAT. 535/22(6) (providing that the original
birth record must be amended to reflect a different paternity designation
found by a circuit court or an administrative agency).
180. See 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 45/7(a) (establishing that an action to
determine the existence of a father-child relationship may be brought by a
man "alleging himself to be the father," even if such a relationship has already
been presumed for another man).
181. See 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 45/7(b-5) (providing that an action to

determine nonexistence of a father-child relationship may be brought by
presumed father who had acknowledged paternity, as long as there was also
an "adjudication").
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involving fraud and the like, may only apply to acknowledging
mothers and fathers, it may be that others - including actual
genetic fathers, children, and state officials - 18 can more easily
disestablish paternity through new civil actions. 2
E. PaternityPresumptions
The Illinois Parentage Act 1m creates certain presumptions
that prompt parent/child relationships. ' One is that a man is
presumed to be the natural father of a child if "he and the child's
natural mother are or have been married to each other, even
though the marriage is or could be declared invalid, and the child
is born or conceived during such marriage.... " 8 5 Another is that
a man is presumed to be the natural father of a child if "after the
child's birth, he and the child's natural mother have married each
other, even though the marriage is or could be declared invalid,
and he is named, with his written consent, as the child's father on
the
child's birth
certificate." 8 '
Unlike
voluntary
acknowledgments, these presumptions are not conclusive. Under the
Illinois Parentage Act of 1984, "they may be rebutted only by clear
and convincing evidence."'87
As well, there are no short and
absolute time periods, such as sixty days, to limit rebuttals.
For a man to disestablish his own paternity grounded on
either marital presumption, he may proceed on a "verified
complaint"" in a court action "to declare the non-existence of the
parent and child relationship," whether or not the presumption led
to "an adjudication of paternity in any judgment."'89 Rebuttal
T

182. Under federal statute, "a signed voluntary acknowledgment of paternity

may be challenged in court only on the basis of fraud, duress, or material
mistake of fact" after the running of a sixty day period.
42 U.S.C.

666(a)(5)(D)(iii). But this sixty day period only applies to "the right of any
signatory to rescind the acknowledgment." 42 U.S.C. 666(a)(5)(D)(ii)(I). Thus,

there seemingly are no written federal statutory guidelines on undoing TANF
driven voluntary paternity acknowledgments by other than signatories (post
sixty day attacks are characterized under federal law as contests or
challenges, and not simply as rescissions, which seemingly has application

only to signatories under (D)(ii)(I)). Cf ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-812(E)
(2001) (providing that, pursuant to ARIZ. CIV. PRO. R. 60(c), a "mother, father
or child, or a party to the proceeding may challenge a voluntary

acknowledgment of paternity established in [the] State at any time after the
sixty day period only on the basis of fraud, duress, or material mistake of
fact").
183. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 45/1-28.
184. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 45/4(2), 5(a).
185. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 45/5(a)(1).
186. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 45/5(a)(2).
187. 750 ILL. CoMP. STAT. 45/5(b).
188. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 45/7(b), 7(b-5).
189. See 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 45/7(b-5) (presumption led to an adjudication);
750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 45/7(b) (presumption did not lead to an adjudication).
While data is hard to find, there appear to be significant numbers of children
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and can follow "an
often is grounded on DNA tests,"
agreement... between an alleged or presumed father and the
mother," regardless of its terms, as long as the agreement was not
"a settlement approved by the court." 9' The man presumed to be
the father has two years to seek disestablishment from the time he
obtained "knowledge of relevant facts,"" though this period cannot
"extend beyond the date on which the child reaches the age of 18
years."'93 So, had Romel Smith been married to Valerie Dawson,
he likely would not have acknowledged paternity and thus might
well have been able to disestablish his presumed paternity,' as
where a marital presumption simply arose or where a marital
presumption was utilized in a marriage dissolution proceeding.9
Others may also seek to directly disestablish paternity
grounded solely on a marital presumption. By statute, the "child"
and the "natural mother" can each seek to "declare the nonexistence of the parent and child relationship" in a civil action by
rebutting either of the marital presumptions. 99 They have two

born to married women where their husbands are not the genetic fathers. See,
e.g., Naomi Cahn & June Carbone, Which Ties Bind? Redefining the ParentChild Relationship in an Age of Genetic Certainty, 11 WM. & MARY BILL RTS.
J. 1011, 1067 n.230 (2003) ("Robin Wright estimates that from five to twentyfive percent of all births to married women involve fathers other than the
mother's husband. Wright, however, does not provide the particulars of the
study on which she relies, and those statistics have never been established
with certainty.").
190. See, e.g., 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 45/7(b-5) (providing that an "adjudicated
father" may use DNA tests to show he is not "the father of the child").
191. 750 ILL. CoMP. STAT. 45/7(d).
192. See 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 45/8(a)(3) (presumption with no adjudication);
750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 45/8(a)(4) (presumption with an adjudication); see also,
e.g., In re Marriage of Adams, 701 N.E.2d 1131 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998) (illustrating
a husband in a dissolution case successfully disestablishing paternity under
750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 45/8(a)(3) for a ten-year old born during the marriage as
he acted about a month after the wife first told him the child was born as a
result of an extramarital affair and not as a result of artificial insemination).
193. See 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 45/8(a)(3) (presumption with no adjudication);
750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 45/8(a)(4) (presumption with adjudication).
For
disestablishment petitions where there are adjudications, the two year limit
also "shall not apply to periods of time where the natural mother or child
refuses to submit" to DNA tests. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 45/8(a)(4). The time
limits are also tolled when a "party is not subject to service of process or is
otherwise not subject to the jurisdiction" of Illinois courts. 750 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 45/8(b).
194. Rebuttal would seem to have been available to a married Romel Smith
so long as he sued within two years of obtaining "knowledge of relevant facts,"
750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 45/8(a)(4), and the 1998 Public Aid case judgment
against Romel was not "a settlement approved by the court," 750 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 45/7(d).
195. See Smith, 818 N.E.2d at 1210 (distinguishing a marriage dissolution
from Romel's voluntary acknowledgment).
196. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 45/7(b).
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years to act after obtaining knowledge of relevant facts,197 which
cannot extend beyond the date on which the child reaches the age
of eighteen years.'98 By contrast, neither the child nor the mother
may so easily disestablish paternity arising from an earlier
marriage dissolution proceeding in which they were active
participants (i.e., the child through a guardian).'
While no others are expressly granted the right to pursue "an
action to declare the non-existence of the parent and child
relationship" founded solely on a marital presumption, 0 as noted
earlier any person or entity who has provided or who is providing
financial support to a child, as well as any man "alleging himself
to be the father of the child," by verified complaint can pursue an
"action to determine the existence of the father and child
relationship whether or not such a relationship is already
presumed" through a marital presumption. 0 1 Such an action to
determine a father-child realtionship usually is only "barred if
brought later than 2 years after the child reaches the age of
majority." 2 Thus, though there is a marital presumption, where
the alleged father or the supporting person or entity prevails in
establishing a father-child relationship based upon the genetic ties
of a man other than the husband, seemingly the "non-existence" of
the husband-child relationship under law, i.e., the disestablishment of the marital presumption, would follow,"n since
two men cannot concurrently be the subject of legal paternity for a
single child in Illinois."4
197. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 45/8(a)(3).
198. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 45/8(a)(3).
199. See, e.g., Simcox v. Simcox, 546 N.E.2d 609, 611 (Ill. 1989) (asserting
that res judicata/collateral estoppel could operate against a wife/mother, or a
child represented by guardian in a paternity action); see also In re Rogers, 665
N.E.2d 36, 39 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996) (reading Simcox to allow a child to proceed in
a new case notwithstanding an earlier dissolution decree if the child was not
represented and there is new and better (DNA) evidence). Of course, in such a
case the mother or child may petition to reopen the dissolution proceeding in
order to obtain a court order modifying the decree as to paternity. See, e.g.,
735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-1401 (2004).
200. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 45/7(b).
201. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 45/7(a).
202. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 45/8(a)(1). If a public agency, other than the
Illinois Department of Public Aid, acts on behalf of a child after it has "ceased
to provide assistance to the child," then the action is "barred 2 years after the
agency has ceased to provide assistance to the child." Id.
203. In re Parentage of John M., 817 N.E.2d 500, 506 (Ill. 2004) (suggesting
a man alleging himself to be the genetic father of a child born to a married
couple, upon filing "apetition to establish parentage," can secure DNA tests
and can rebut a marital presumption if testing shows "the presumed father is
not the biological father").
204. Compare California, where two presumed fathers compete for a single,
legal paternity designation, and Louisiana, which allows at times "dual
paternity." See In re Jesusa V., 32 Cal. 4th 588, 598 (2004) (noting that choice
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The Illinois Supreme Court decided a case in 2004, In re
Parentage of John M., wherein judicial guidance was sought
regarding disestablishments of legal paternities founded solely on
marital presumptions by men who allege they are genetic fathers
and who
seek visitation and child support orders.205
Unfortunately, the high court could not provide much help,2" in
part because disputed facts (over the nature of the husband-wife
and genetic father-mother relationships) were never subject to
0 '
evidentiary hearings."
The court did, however, suggest that the
alleged genetic father had a right to demand DNA testing." The
court also suggested that genetic fathers who are rapists, or who
"come in ten years later" saying "I want a cotton swab, I'm the
dad," would likely lose."° But it also hinted that genetic fathers
between two presumed natural fathers, each of whom held the child out as his
own and received the child into his home, was based upon "the weightier
considerations of policy and logic"); T.D. v. M.M.M., 730 So. 2d 873, 875 (La.
1999) (recognizing dual paternity, here encompassing both a husband
presumed to be the legal father and the biological father, though the two male
parents will not always possess similar parental rights; a biological father can
seek to establish paternity in a nonstatutory "avowal" action). At times, even
in Illinois, paternity may vest in two men, but in different contexts. See, e.g.,
In re Marriage of Purcell, 825 N.E.2d 724 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005) (holding that
paternity was disestablished for former husband for support purposes so that
child could recover SSD benefits after his genetic father died; former husband,
however, pursuant to an earlier marriage dissolution settlement agreement,
was allowed to continue with child visitation).
205. See In re Parentageof John M., 817 N.E.2d at 502 (noting that plaintiff
Javier sought to establish a father-child relationship under 750 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 45/7 with baby John, born to defendant Maria during her marriage to
Dennis).
206. The court ruled that it is not unconstitutional to allow at least some
genetic fathers to pursue a paternity action involving a child born to a mother
who was at some point during the pregnancy or at the birth married to
another man in the absence of "a prior best interests [of the child] hearing."
Id. at 509.
207. See id. at 508-09 (holding that thetrial court should not have ruled on
the argument that the Parentage Act of 1984 was unconstitutional "as
applied" to the husband and the child because the court never held an
evidentiary hearing).
The husband had argued that the Act was
unconstitutional because the it did not mandate a "best interest" of the child
determination before allowing an interloper into a marriage to proceed. Id. at
502.
208. Id. at 506 (citing 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 45/11(a) (2004)). An earlier,
similar ruling was reached in J.S.A. v. M.H., 797 N.E.2d 705, 709 (Ill. App. Ct.
2003), vacated on procedural grounds by J.S.A. v. M.H. 841 N.E.2d 983 (Ill.
App. Ct. 2005).
209. In re Parentageof John M., 817 N.E.2d at 510 (referencing arguments
made by the husband to show how a disestablishment order procured by the
genetic father would be unconstitutional). The "absence of any time limit" also
bothered the trial judge. Id. at 503 (quoting from trial court ruling); see also
750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 45/8(a)(1) (2004) (providing that an action to determine
the existence of a father and child relationship by a man alleging himself to be
the genetic father is only "barred if brought later than 2 years after the child
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who lived with their children since birth, with the marriages
between the presumed fathers/husbands and mothers/wives
"already disintegrated," would win. 2" The high court urged that
reformers who had public policy difficulties with such
disestablishments should go to the General Assembly rather than
" ' Such General Assembly
the courts.21
consideration is only a part
of the possible legislative reform contemplated herein.
F. Administrative Determinations

The Illinois Department of Public Aid can, "by rule," provide
for administrative determinations of paternity in cases involving
"applicants for or recipients of financial aid."212 Final administrative decisions in the Department are reviewed in
accordance with the Administrative Review Law21 3 and "have the
full force and effect of a court judgment of paternity entered under
the Illinois Parentage Act of 1984. "2"4 These decisions need not
involve proof of actual genetic ties between the child and the man
deemed to be the father. For example, "default" determinations
"may be made" after proper service,2 5 and deoxyribonucleic acid
(DNA) tests are not mandated where the alleged father does
appear.216
The Illinois Administrative Code distinguishes the processes
for "uncontested" and "contested" administrative determinations,217
though both processes lead to similar administrative paternity
orders.218 Parties "aggrieved" by such orders can petition the
Department for "release" more than thirty days after entry.1 9
reaches the age of majority").
210. In re Parentage of John M., 817 N.E.2d at 510 (observing that the
husband "hald] not shown why it would be unconstitutional" to allow
disestablishment by the genetic father in this setting, even though there was
no "best interest" of the child hearing).
211. Id. at 511. Earlier, similar pleas were voiced in J.S.A., 797 N.E.2d at
711 (Barry, J., specially concurring) ("[I1t is necessary that the legislature
amend the Parentage Act ....
").
212. 305 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/10-17.7 (2004).
213. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/3-101 to -113 (2004).
214. 305 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/10-17.7.
215. Id.
216. Id. "[I]n determining paternity," an administrative hearing office
should act "in accordance with Section 11 of the Parentage Act of 1984," id.,
which provides in section (a) that upon the request of a party testing is
ordered, and in section (h) that officers may order tests on their own motions
and that the "expense of the tests" should be paid by requesting alleged
fathers who are not indigent, 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 45/11 (2004).
217. ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 89, § 160.61(b)-(c) (2004).
218. ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 89, § 160.61(d).
219. ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 89, § 160.61(e)(1). Aggrieved parties seemingly
are limited to parents. ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 89, § 160.61(e)(3) (establishing
that notice of filing a copy of a petition "must be served on the other parent by
certified mail"). Cf. 305 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/10-12(a) (providing that a
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These de facto disestablishment petitions usually must be filed
within two years of entry, though more time is allotted anyone
from whom "the
ground for relief is concealed from the person
22
relief."
seeking
G. CircuitCourt Actions
Illinois circuit courts can determine paternity in marriage
dissolution proceedings, 2 1' as well as in civil actions based upon
verified complaints seeking "to determine the existence of the
father and child relationship."" The latter may be pursued: "by
the child; the mother; a pregnant woman; any person or public
agency who has custody of, or is providing or has provided
financial support to, the child ... ; or a man presumed or alleging
himself to be the father of the child or expected child."223 Such
actions may be pursued even if there is already a father recognized
under law who is not "the person or persons alleged to be the
father of the child."2 24 But, such actions usually are "barred if
brought later
than 2 years after the child reaches the age of
225
majority."
A circuit court action determining paternity in a marriage
dissolution case may be challenged by the parties pursuant to a
"responsible relative aggrieved by an administrative order... under Section
10-17.7" may petition for release or modification within 30 days).
220. ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 89, § 160.61(e)(2)(C)(iii); see also 305 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 5/10-12(b) (providing that "a man against whom a default determination
of paternity has been entered" may seek an order vacating the determination
within thirty days of being served); 305 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/10-14.1
(establishing a two year period for a responsible relative or recipient of child
support services to seek relief from an administrative determination of
paternity under the relief from judgments statute, 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/214.1 (2004)).
221. See, e.g., 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/505(a) (2004) ("In a proceeding for
dissolution of marriage... the court may order either or both parents owing a
duty of support to a child of the marriage to pay an amount reasonable and
necessary for his support, without regard to marital misconduct.").
222. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 45/7(a) (2004).
223. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 45/7(a). Where the child is under eighteen, the
action on the child's behalf may need to be pursued by a guardian, next friend
or the like, rather than simply by the child. Kiak v. Skellion, 741 N.E.2d 288
(Ill. App. Ct. 2000).
224. See 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 45/7(a) (providing that a paternity action is
permitted even if a father-child relationship "is already presumed under
Section 5" of the Illinois Parentage Act (relating to children born to married
couples)); see also, e.g., J.S.A., 797 N.E.2d at 705 (illustrating a parentage
claim by man who had an affair with a married woman and who sued after
their relationship ended, about three years after birth).
225. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 45/8(a)(1). The limiatations period is shorter in
certain instances involving public agences, as where a public agency, other
than the Illinois Department of Public Aid, acts on behalf of a child after it has
"ceased to provide assistance to the child," in which case the action is "barred
2 years after the agency has ceased to provide assistance to the child." Id.
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motion for relief from judgment."' Parties always include the
husband and wife and may include a child born before, during, or
after the marriage, as when the child is made a party through the
appointment of a guardian ad litem. Where such a child was not a
party, or in privity with a party,2 7 in the dissolution case, the child
seemingly is not precluded by the dissolution decree from
litigating paternity later. 28
Thus, a child may effectively
disestablish a husband's paternity through a new civil action to
determine the existence of a father and child relationship with a
man who was not the husband. 229 A similar civil action apparently
can also be pursued by a public agency acting on behalf of a child,
as well as on the agency's own financial interests in securing
reimbursement of child support.
Besides a motion for relief from judgment, a marriage
dissolution judgment addressing paternity may also be challenged
in a new civil action by the husband. A circuit court action
determining "the existence" of paternity upon exploring "the father
and child relationship"" may be challenged later under statute by
"the man adjudicated to be the father" if the earlier parentage
designation was founded on a marital presumption of paternity
and if the man demonstrates by DNA tests that he is "not the
natural father. " "n Such a challenge must be brought within "2
years after the petitioner obtains actual knowledge of relevant
facts." 2
While the aforenoted statute does not expressly grant
standing to others to challenge earlier circuit court paternity
determinations in marriage dissolution cases via new cases

226. See 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-1301(e) (filing less than thirty days after
judgment entry, relief is granted where "reasonable"); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT.
5/2-1401(a) (filing more than thirty days after judgment entry, relief may be
granted on a number of grounds, including those traditionally available).
227. For a case involving the childrens' legal interests and illustrating the
situation when children are in privity with a married or formerly married
parent, see, for example, Singer v. Brookman, 578 N.E.2d 1, 3-4 (Ill. App. Ct.
1991). For a general review of Illinois privity precedents, see Yorulmazoglu v.
Lake ForestHospital, 834 N.E.2d 468 (Ill.
App. Ct. 2005).
228. See, e.g., Simcox 546 N.E.2d at 611 (noting that earlier dissolution

judgment only binds child, under preclusion principles, where child was in

privity with a parent, and privity is not presumed as a parent's and a child's

interests may differ).

229. See, e.g., In re Rogers, 665 N.E.2d at 39 (saying courts should determine
each paternity case on an individual basis, as each case arises or falls on its

particular set of facts).

230. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 45/7(a).
231. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 45/7(b-5). DNA tests disproving genetic ties are a
precondition to these circuit court actions. In re Marriage of Kates, 761
N.E.2d 153, 158 (Ill. 2001).
232. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 45/8(a)(4). However, the limitations period is not

to extend beyond the time the child turns eighteen. Id.
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founded on the "existence of the father and child relationship, " "
another statute does allow a civil action "to declare the nonexistence of the parent and child relationship" to be "brought by
the child, the natural mother or a man" subject to a marital
paternity presumption.234 This provision may allow a child or a
mother to challenge, indirectly, an earlier marriage dissolution
judgment of paternity similar to the way "the man adjudicated to
be the father" may do directly. 35 Any such challenge in a new civil
action must also be presented within "2 years after the petitioner
obtains knowledge of relevant facts."" 6 If this provision does not
allow such a challenge, as when preclusion principles estop the
child or mother," 7 presumably a child or a natural mother may
still challenge the earlier paternity finding in a dissolution case
founded on a marital presumption through a motion for relief from
judgment.2"
Where there are challenges to circuit court paternity
judgments that are not founded on marital presumptions, as
where the mothers were unwed, the aforenoted statutes clearly do
not apply. In these cases relief from judgment petitions under
general civil procedure standards2. 9 can serve as paternity
disestablishment vehicles. Petitions for relief from such paternity
court judgments "must be filed not later than 2 years" after entry,
though timing is tolled when "the ground for relief is fraudulently
concealed."24' Finally, should an alleged error in such a paternity
judgment appear very shortly after entry of judgment (within
thirty days of the order), the court may undo the judgment where
"reasonable."2 '

233. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 45/7(a).
234. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 45/7(b). Note that a new civil action pursued by
an alleged genetic father is not sanctioned. See, e.g., Lisa I. v. The Superior
Court of Los Angeles County, 34 Cal. Rptr. 3d 927 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005)
(holding that the alleged genetic father could not pursue paternity of a child
conceived during marriage that was dissolved before birth, where the child
had no persional relationship with the father).
235. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 45/7(b-5).
236. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 45/8(a)(3). However, the limitations period is not
to extend beyond the time the child turns eighteen. Id.
237. See, e.g., Simcox, 546 N.E.2d at 611 (noting that children who were not

parties to earlier marriage dissolution proceedings would not be bound by any
findings of paternity).

238. See 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-1401 (2004) (governing a motion for relief
filed more than thirty days after judgment entry); see also, e.g., In re Marriage
of Klebs, 554 N.E.2d 298 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990) (employing the Parentage Act

provisions, including the two year limitations period, to a section 2-1401
motion for relief from a marriage dissolution judgment where the mother
sought to disestablish her husband's paternity).
239. 735 ILL. COMp. STAT. 5/2-1401(a).
240. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-1401(c).
241. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-1301(e).
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One case involving a post-thirty-day petition for relief from a
nonmarital paternity court judgment is Lipscomb v. Wells.242
There, Tyree Wells agreed to a paternity case judgment on July
29, 1988, without prior DNA testing. His conduct was based upon
statements by the mother, Beatryce Lipscomb, that "he was the
natural father" of Veronica Lipscomb and that she "had no other
relations with other men" around the time of Veronica's
conception. 243 After being told in December, 1998 by Beatryce at
her home that he was not the child's natural father,2 " Tyree filed a
verified petition on February 2, 2000, under Section 2-1401 of the
Code of Civil Procedure, seeking an order to compel DNA testing
in order to determine parentage. 245 Beatryce argued that the twoyear statute of limitations under section 2-1401 had expired.
Tyree responded that the period was tolled due to Beatryce's
fraudulent concealment. The trial court found for Tyree, stating
that he was deprived of the opportunity to request a DNA test in
1988 by Beatryce's concealment of a "material fact."246
In
affirming, the appellate court noted that typically "'fraudulent
concealment sufficient to toll a statute of limitations consists of
affirmative acts designed to prevent discovery of a cause of action
or grounds for relief and silence alone does not constitute
fraudulent concealment.'" 2 4 Here, the appellate court found that
Beatryce was "not merely silent" as to her child's paternity, but
rather "asserted with certainty" that Tryee was, in fact, the
genetic father.24' The court hinted that Tyree could not have
challenged the paternity judgment in an action to declare the
nonexistence of a parent-child relationship as DNA testing was a
prerequisite.249 The court distinguished a similar Section 2-1401
case by suggesting that the "abuse of discretion review" standard
effectively allowed trial judges finding comparable facts to rule
differently on the issue of fraudulent concealment.25 °
242. 761 N.E.2d 218, 219 (Ill.
App. Ct. 2001).
243. Id. at 219.
244. The admission came during a quarrel over Christmas shopping money
for Veronica. Id. at 220.
245. Id. at 219.
246. Id. at 220.
247. Id. at 222 (quoting Halas v. Executor of Estate of Halas, 445 N.E.2d
1264, 1271 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1983)).
248. Id.
249. Id. at 226.
250. Id. at 225. The court in Lipscomb distinguished Ptaszek v. Michalik,
606 N.E.2d 115 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992), on the basis that the court in Ptaszek
refused to overturn a trial court's denial of relief based on abuse of discrection
with facts distingushable from Lipscomb, whereas in Lipscomb the court was
upholding a grant of relief and thereby validated the trial court's discretion.
Such differing results, seemingly a matter of discretion, would be less likely if
there were special statutory standards guiding petitions for relief from
paternity court judgments. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 7645-47 (West 2004);
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Besides petitions for postjudgment relief, paternity court
judgments not founded on marital presumptions may also be
subject to challenge through new civil actions, especially by those
not parties to the earlier proceedings.
Thus, a judgment of
paternity in a parentage action involving a determination of the
existence of a "father and child relationship, 51 as between an
unwed mother and one alleged father, may be subject to challenge
in a new civil action involving the same child, but brought by
either the child or by a second man alleging that he is the genetic
father. Under statute, this new civil action may be pursued even if
there is already a father recognized under law who is not "the
person or persons alleged to be the father of the child.""'2
H. Artificial Inseminations
At the time of birth, a parent-child relationship may be
established, in the absence of consensual sexual intercourse
between adults,253 through a gestational surrogacy arrangement
meeting statutory requirements. 54 These requirements demand
certifications from those most intimately involved (gestational
surrogate, her husband, intended mother, and intended father)
regarding intentions as well as the sources for sperm and egg
donations.5
Seemingly, surrogacy pacts must anticipate two
different sex parents, as both an intended mother and an intended
father are required.25 As well, a licensed physician must certify
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3119.961 (West 2004).
251. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 45/7(a) (2004).
252. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 45/7.
253. Other parent-child relationships arising at the time of birth in the
absence of consensual adult sex (as with at-birth adoptions, or with children
born of rapes (statutory or otherwise), or of turkey basters) are not discussed
herein.
254. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 45/6(a). There is no discussion herein of what
some might describe as a gestational surrogacy arising from consensual sexual
intercourse. For a review and critique of the Illinois Gestational Surrogacy
Act, see Jeremy J. Richey, A Troublesome Good Idea: An Analysis of the
Illinois Gestational SurrogacyAct, 30 S. ILL. UNIV. L.J. 169 (2005) (suggesting
a change in the reasonableness criteria on compensation, change to allow a
prospective gestational surrogate to breach a surrogacy contract before she
becomes pregnant, and change to address the matter of abortion).
255. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 45/6(a)(1)(A)-(D).
256. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 45/6(a)(1)(C), (D). Cf Kristine H. v. Lisa R., 16
Cal. Rptr. 3d 123 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004) (reading California statute on presumed
"fathers" to apply to second mothers in a case involving two lesbian partners
whose relationship ended after each parented a child for two years, one of the
partners had given birth to the child, and both had obtained a prebirth court
judgment founded on their agreement that they be "joint intended legal
parents"), reversed on other grounds, Kristine H. v. Lisa R., 117 P.3d 690 (Cal.
2005) (ruling that birth mother is estopped from challenging prebirth court
judgment almost two years later while noting that public policy favors a child
having two parents rather than one).
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that any later-born child "is the biological child of the intended
mother or the intended father or both and that neither the
gestational surrogate nor the gestational surrogate's husband, if
any, is a biological parent."2 57 There is a presumption of legal
parentage for the gestational surrogate and her husband (if she
has one) if the statutory guidelines are not "met prior to the birth
of the child."2"
Similarly, a parent-child relationship under common law,
with one mother and one father, can arise in other settings where
birth results from artificial insemination. For example, there may
be an artificially-inseminated unmarried woman who intends to be
the legal mother. Illinois statutory provisions guide married
couples 5 9 while common law precedents guide unmarried
heterosexual couples.2"
These days, more and more couples deemed nontraditional in
the eyes of the law, e.g., same sex, seek to establish legal
parentage at birth founded on prebirth agreements involving
artificial insemination. Clearly, any legal recognition of dual
paternity or dual maternity are more controversial, 1 and have
generated few Illinois precedents to date.262
257. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 45/6(a)(1)(E).

The intended mother and the

intended father need not be biologically connected to the child as each may

employ a "donor." 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 45/6(a)(1)(C), (D).
258. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 45/6(a)(2).
259. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 40/3 (2004).
260. In re M.J., 787 N.E.2d at 152 (recognizing a common law action founded
on oral contract or promissory estoppel for child support arising out of an
unwed man's consent to artificial insemination).
261. See Elisa B. v. Superior Court, 117 P.3d 660 (Cal. 2005) (holding that a
former lesbian partner is responsible for the support of a child born to the
other partner through artificial insemination by an anonymous donor where
the two women had agreed to coparent before conception and had actually
coparented for a few years); K.M. v. E.G., 117 P.3d 673 (Cal. 2005) (holding
that lesbians in domestic partnership are both parents where one woman's
eggs were used by the other woman who went through in-vitro fertilization to
bear a child); Kristine H., 117 P.3d at 696 (holding that two lesbians were both
parents pursuant to a prebirth stipulated judgment declaring them joint legal
parents of any later-born child resulting from an in-home artificial
insemination using the semen of a friend who was paid and who agreed in
writing not to seek custody or visitation); see also In re Parentage of L.B., 122
P.3d 161, 170 (Wash. 2005) (declaring a "de facto parentage" for former lesbian
partner for a child born as a result of artificial insemination). See generally
Susan Frelich Appleton, Presuming Women: Revisiting the Presumption of
Legitimay in the Same-Sex Couples Era, 86 B.U. L. REV. 227 (2006) (arguing
that the presumption should not be available for all surrogacy cases or in all
jurisdictions); Steven H. Snyder & Mary Patricia Byrn, The Use of Prebirth
ParentageOrders in Surrogacy Proceedings, 39 FAM. L.Q. 633 (2005) (arguing
that pre-birth parentage orders should not be available for all surrogacy cases
or in all jurisdictions).
262. But see, e.g., In re Marrieage of Simmons, 825 N.E.2d 303 (Ill. App. Ct.
2005) (holding that transsexual male did not have standing to seek visitation

1334

The John Marshall Law Review

[39:1295

As well, there is little Illinois precedent or statutory guidance
on disestablishments of paternity arising from artificial
inseminations, as when, for example, birth mothers seek to
disestablish paternity of men who thought they were geneticallytied and parents as a result, but who were later shown to have no
biological links.
I.

Actual Parenting

Finally, legal paternity can arise for a nongenetic father in
Illinois based upon actual pre-birth and/or at-birth parenting,263
usually with maternal consent.2" More often, legal paternity will
arise for a nongenetic father retroactively, after an extended
period of actual post-birth parenting that began before or at
birth.265 Thus, in Koelle v. Zwiren,266 Erik Koelle, a nongenetic
father who had parented Jane Roe, born in 1984, during her first
eight years, was able to pursue a claim for visitation against the
birth mother, Jan Zwiren, who allegedly misrepresented to Erik
that he was the genetic father." 7 Erik never completed a paternity
with a child born to his/her "wife" via artificial insemination undertaken by
couple jointly).
263. Similarly, legal parenthood, or quasi-parenthood, might arise for others
(who never could have been genetic parents) based upon actual parenting,
often with maternal consent. See, e.g., In re Custody of Walters, 529 N.E.2d
308 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988) (involving a grandparent); In re Marriage of
Engelkens, 821 N.E.2d 799 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004) (involving a stepparent). For a
review of the de facto parentage doctrine, see L.B., 122 P.3d at 166-69
(applying doctrine to same-sex couple who agreed to raise a child born to one
of the partners artificially inseminated with the help of a male friend).
264. Whether prebirth or at-birth maternal consent is always required is
unclear. See, e.g., In re Custody of Townsend, 427 N.E.2d 1231, 1233 (Ill.
1981), overuled on other grounds by In re R.L.S., 844 N.E.2d 22 (Ill.
2006)
(holding that natural mother's stepdaughter may have visitation rights with
child over objection of natural father who sought full and exclusive custody
(the natural mother was in prison for killing natural father's wife)). Maternal
consent leading to a man's visitation rights may even involve a married
woman who consents to her husband's actual parenting even though he was
not genetically-tied. See In re Marriage of Purcell, 825 N.E.2d at 728
(illustrating a situation where paternity for support purposes, but not
visitation, was disestablished, and consent came via an agreed order in a
marriage dissolution case).
265. Such legal paternity "relates back" so that postbirth conduct will result
in the man being deemed a legal parent as of the time of birth (so that, for
example, failed child support responsibilities can be pursued in court
proceedings leading to financial child support obligations accruing since birth).
Cf FED. R. CIV. P. 15(c) (providing that an amended pleading relates back to
date of original pleading).
266. 672 N.E.2d 868 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996).
267. See Koelle, 672 N.E.2d at 870-71 (noting that Jan had been Erik's
stepmother before Erik's father died and before they engaged in sexual
intercourse, and that Jan was concerned about whether everyone knew the
genetic father was a wealthy, married man who was a client of Jan's
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acknowledgment nor filed early on a paternity suit." Based on
Jan's representations, Erik simply developed a loving and caring
relationship with Jane.269 When Erik discovered through testing in
1992 that he was not the genetic father, he sought visitation
rights.270 Jan objected, arguing that Erik was not entitled to
visitation "because he was not a natural or adoptive parent." 7' An
appellate court found that visitation may be appropriate if Jane
"wants to see" Erik and if visitation is in Jane's best interests.
The court ruled that there needed to be a hearing that included
"testimony from competent experts."27' In remanding for such a
hearing, the court seemingly determined not only that Erik's
"paternity" was or could be established by actual parenting, but
also that any "paternity" could be disestablished and his
visitations discontinued if Jane's desire for visits and her best
interests were not demonstrated, given the presumption favoring
Jan's "superior" right as the birth mother to care for her child. 2'
J.

Summary

There are varying ways in Illinois to establish legal paternity.
Some, but not all, are governed by statute. The nonstatutory
forms remain especially unclear. Some, but not all,274 roads to
paternity demand an indication of genetic ties between men and
children. Some, in fact, exclude genetic fathers who wish to parent
(as when there are intact marriages). Some require consent by the
men while others do not. Some require maternal cooperation
before men can become fathers-in-law, at times even when the
Some arise under written laws
men are genetically-tied.
governing children who are receiving public aid or who are
involved in state child support services. Childrens' best interests
at times are not actually considered in designating legal
paternity.7
advertising agency).
268. Erik sought visitation in a lawsuit that also alleged claims against Jan
for fraud and intentional infliction of emotional distress arising from Jan's
conduct by initiating sexual contact while lying about her chances for
pregnancy and then later lying about Erik's genetic ties. Id. at 870-71.
269. Id. at 871.
270. Id. at 872. Erik also sought money damages from Jan for fraud and
intentional infliction of emotional distress. Id. at 870. The appellate court
sustained the sufficiency of these claims. Id. at 875.
271. Id. at 872.
272. Id. at 873.
273. Id. at 872 (citing In re Custody of Townsend, 427 N.E.2d at 1234).
274. But see Crystal M. Pipher, Note, The Effect of In re Devon M. on the
Illinois ParentageAct and Illinois Public Policy, 29 S. ILL. U. L.J. 531 (2005)
(suggesting that "paternity as a sanction" against a man who refuses to
submit to a court-ordered paternity test should rarely be utilized).
275. This approach is well-criticized in Steven N. Peskind, Who's Your
Daddy?: An Analysis of Illinois' Law of Parentage and the Meaning of
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There are, as well, differing standards for disestablishing
paternity. 7 6 Disestablishments do not always follow proof that the
established fathers-in-law have no genetic ties with their children.
Some disestablishment petitioners have very short limitations
periods while others have extended time. Some disestablishment
petitions require proof of fraud, duress, or material mistake of fact.
At times, disestablishment proceedings involve a state agency that
is also seeking a paternity designation for a second man where
some form of public aid has been afforded the child. Moreover,
paternity disestablishments may be unaffected by proof of
significant maternal misconduct regarding the circumstances of
birth.77
Certain distinctions in paternity establishment and
disestablishment settings are necessary. Similar parental rights
and responsibilities are not warranted for all genetic fathers, for
all nongenetic fathers who have actually parented, or for all men
first designated as fathers-in-law as of the time of birth. All
genetic mothers should not have to act similarly when legal
paternity is at issue - married mothers need different standards
than unmarried mothers.
Yet, due process and equal protection limits always must be
honored. These limits are quite substantial for paternity laws
since often "a fundamental constitutional right is implicated,"2 8
including "'the interest of parents in the care, custody and control
of their children. .. perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty
interests,'" with deep roots "'in this Nation's history and
tradition.' 2 9
Unfortunately, paternity establishment and
Parenthood,35 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 811 (2004).

276. Paternity establishments and disestablishments sought after the death
of the alleged genetic father are not reviewed herein. See generally Binion v.
Chater, 108 F.3d 780 (7th Cir. 1997) (illustrating a suit to establish paternity
under Illinois law of a dead husband, a presumed father, as the genetic father,
and thus the legal father for purpose of a child's recovery of Social Security
survivor's benefits, where the husband was unnoted on the birth certificate
and where the husband was not deemed to be the legal father in a later
divorce decree).
277. Compare 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/505(a) (2004) (instructing that child
support order in marriage dissolution proceeding should not reflect
consideration of any "marital misconduct"), with 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 45/6(d)
(2004) (providing that fraud or duress may be used to rescind voluntary
acknowledgment of paternity).
278. In re D.W., 827 N.E.2d at 480 (declaring that when there is no
fundamental right at play, due process and equal protection mandates still
require that lawmakers act only when their initiatives "bear[] a rational
relationship to a legitimate state interest").
279. Id. at 481 (quoting Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 123-24
(1989)). It is unclear at times who such parents are. Do nongenetic dads who
have actually childreared since birth, with maternal consent, ever gain the
fundamental federal constitutional right to parent, or are such parental rights
simply matters for state lawmakers, who are often moved to recognize
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disestablishment distinctions are, at times, problematic on public
policy, if not constitutional, grounds.
IV.

REFORMING ILLINOIS PATERNITY DISESTABLISHMENT
STANDARDS

Fundamental rights28 ° are usually implicated in Illinois
paternity disestablishment proceedings regardless of the
technique employed for establishing paternity or of the party
seeking disestablishment. When such rights are implicated, due
process requires that such proceedings promote "compelling" state
interests with laws that are "narrowly tailored" and that utilize
"the least restrictive means consistent with the attainment of the
government's goal."28' As well, "the constitutional guarantee of
equal protection requires that the government treat similarly
situated individuals in a similar manner."282 Unfortunately, many
Illinois paternity disestablishment standards, at times prompted
by federal welfare statutes, fail to measure up. They fail both
procedurally and substantively, thus infringing upon "the most
basic" of civil rights - conceiving and raising (or nowadays more
frequently perhaps just raising) children.2" The following, more
particular observations on contemporary Illinois paternity
disestablishments suggest areas for reform by both the Illinois
General Assembly and the United States Congress.
parental rights in order to further the best interests of children rather then
interests of genetic fathers?
280. See id. (discussing the "fundamental constitutional right" of parents "to
control the upbringing of their children").
281. Id. at 481. Disestablishment of the paternity opportunity interest a
genetic father has in his child may also be sought though the man has not yet
become a parent under law with the fundamental right to childrear. See Lehr
v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 260 (1983) (concurring with a prior observation of
Justice Stewart's that the fundamental right of parentage requires the
existance of an enduring relationship in order to arise, and does not merely
spring from biological connections).
As this interest also has federal
constitutional protection, there are federal due process (and equal protection)
safeguards, though they are less than the safeguards afforded genetic fathers
recognized as parents under law. Paternity opportunity interests are more
fully described in Jeffrey A. Parness, FederalizingBirth CertificateProcedures,
42 BRANDEIS L.J. 105, 109-17 (2003) (also comparing maternity and paternity
laws).
282. In re D.W., 827 N.E.2d at 482.
283. Id. at 481 (internal quotation marks omitted). The court also noted that
such rights are perhaps "'the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests."' Id.
(quoting Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 123-24 (1989)).
284. While the focus here is on disestablishments, there is much clearly
wrong with paternity establishment procedures as well. See, e.g., Dep't of Pub.
Aid v. Liesman, 578 N.E.2d 310 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991). Because actions to
establish father and child relationships need not involve as parties all legally
interested persons (mother, child, any putative father), successive actions
involving parentage of the same child are permitted.
In Liesman, the
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Consider first the varying forms of statutory and
nonstatutory voluntary acknowledgments of paternity. Securing
such an acknowledgment around the time of birth to an unwed
mother seems important whether or not the mother has received,
or will soon receive, public assistance.
The state should be
similarly interested in designating legal fatherhood for all
newborns, and not simply become truly interested only when
financial reimbursement or reduced welfare payments come into
play. A birth certificate for a child born to an unwed mother
should normally contain the name of the genetic father, secured
upon the reasonable belief of blood ties. Earlier Illinois birth
certificate laws reflected this policy (though implementation too
frequently was lacking).8 5 Such a policy would promote the
longstanding public interest in early, accurate, informed, and
conclusive
designations of legal
paternity.
Voluntary
acknowledgments should be permitted shortly before birth as well
as at birth (since testing is not required), and should be subject to
execution in varying locations - hospitals, agency offices, courts,
etc. though with similar procedural safeguards in place
everywhere.
At times, perhaps, as with soldiers in Iraq,
executions by expectant mothers and fathers should be permitted
at different times and in different locations.
Alternatively, a voluntary paternity registration opportunity
for the unwed mother alone, or for the unwed father alone, could
281
be modeled on the Putative Father Registry for men believing
that he is or will be a genetic father whose child may be placed for
adoption by the mother. A singular registration should be founded
on the unwed mother's or the alleged father's clear and
unequivocal representation of genetic ties between the unborn
child and the named man, at least where there is no reason to
doubt the registrar. A man named by a woman would be given
notice so that he could act to formalize paternity as well as
Department of Public Aid could proceed on behalf of the child to establish
paternity (so that it could receive reimbursement for financial assistance it

had provided) against a man who had earlier prevailed (for procedural reasons
involving the mother's discovery failures) in a similar suit brought by the
same department with the same mother. Id.; see also Dep't of Pub. Aid v.
Wheeler, 618 N.E.2d 1311 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993) (illustrating a case similar to

Leisman but where mother's earlier paternity suit was dismissed for unknown

reasons).
285. See, e.g., 410 ILL. COMP. STAT. 535/12(4) (1992) (amended 1993)
(providing that birthing facility personnel were responsible "for preparing and
filing the birth certificate," and should have undertaken "a reasonable effort to
obtain the signatures of both parents"). On the failure of implementation, see
Jeffrey A. Parness, Designating Male Parents at Birth, 26 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 573, 575-78 (1993) (describing in part the results of author's 1991

survey of Illinois birthing facilities).

286. The guidelines are found in 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 50/12.1 (2004)
(seemingly limited to settings where there will or may be an adoption).
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actually parent, or at least so that he is aware of the potential for
future child support responsibilities. Likewise, a mother would be
given notice of a man's registration, alerting her to the potential
for later child visitation, custody, or support petitions, as well as
barriers to adoption.
Moreover, it is important to trust unwed mothers who name
men absent at birth as the genetic fathers. Mothers must be made
fully aware, however, of the negative consequences that can follow
any affirmative misrepresentations (e.g., as to the man and/or as
to her certitude of his genetic ties). In contrast, there may be less
reason to trust men who declare their genetic ties in the absence of
testing and of maternal cooperation.
Single paternity registrations hopefully will help prompt
more genetic fathers of children born to unwed mothers to become
actual parents, regardless of whether they are present at the birth
and whether they wish to be recognized under law at the time of
birth.28 ' The fact that federal statutes require that voluntary
paternity acknowledgments be deemed the equivalents of judicial
paternity determinations, and thus need both maternal and
paternal signatures,' does not mean that states cannot permit
single paternity registrations by expectant mothers or by alleged
genetic fathers.
Single registrations, of course, would not
constitute legal findings and should operate like putative father
registries (including, then, certain confidentiality assurances).
Further, it makes little sense to treat differently comparable
voluntary paternity concessions. Men in different settings may be
similarly motivated to admit paternity due to perceived genetic
ties. Significant comparability among all concessions is furthered
if similar forms and related procedures are utilized in hospitals, in
agency offices, in courts, and perhaps even in lawyers' offices and
elsewhere, when paternity admissions are made by men around
the time of birth. The forms and procedures utilized in court cases
may need to differ in some respects, but they too should be
substantially comparable. 89' All voluntary paternity concessions
287. Of course, genetic fathers whose sexual assaults led to pregnancies or
whose acts of domestic violence can be clearly anticipated are different. Such

a maternal registration would likely not automatically trigger fundamental
childrearing rights for the man named, as he would usually have to take some
initiative under state law in order to move from simply a federal parental (or
paternity) opportunity interest to the fundamental federal and state

childrearing right. See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Parness, Abortions of the Parental
Prerogativesof Unwed Natural Fathers:Deterring Lost Paternity, 53 OKLA. L.
REV. 345, 374-80 (2000).

288. 42 U.S.C. 666(a)(5)(c), (d) (2000).
289. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 19-7-4(b)(5) (providing no relief from
paternity and child support judgment where nongenetic father under law,
while knowing of the lack of genetic ties, acknowledged paternity in a "sworn

statement," signed a "voluntary acknowledgment" form, "proclaimed" himself
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should be undertaken, to the extent possible, with informed and
reasonable assent.
More uniform voluntary paternity concession procedures in
different settings, and greater encouragement of early paternity
identification should be accompanied by more unified guidelines
on undoing legal paternity. Men whose children do not receive
public aid should not have longer to rescind certain forms of
paternity concessions and should not have different rescission
guidelines.
Men seeking to rescind comparable paternity
admissions based upon fraud, duress, or material mistake of fact
should not have procedural or substantive standards significantly
differentiated by when and where the admissions were given.
In considering possible paternity law reforms in Illinois, early
on it will be crucial to ponder the respective roles of the General
Assembly, the courts, and certain administrative agencies.
Common law developments for certain issues may be wise, as
when slowly evolving legal standards are optimal in light of
everchanging human experience and scientific understanding.2 9 ° A
one-statute (or one-case or one-rule) fits all approach is wrong,
especially where regulated human conduct is largely unpredictable
and ever-changing. Localized experimentations (as with single
parent (female and male) registrations beyond the Putative Father
Registry) should also be considered. Kinks can be worked out
more easily and public awareness and acceptance of new legal
standards can develop slowly.
For other issues, exclusive
statutory guidance may be prudent, as it will better secure
desirable uniformity and demand that democratic processes
inquire into and reflect public opinion. General Assembly action,
of course, could override judicial precedents deemed unsound.29 '
Yet for other issues, regulatory initiatives might be best, especially
where technical expertise, practical experience, and the flexibility
of agency rulemaking procedures will be important to formulating
sound public policy.

the genetic father, or agreed to child support in writing).
290. On the dangers of employing common law developments to address
legal parentage issues (including the undermining of the General Assembly's
responsibilities in reflecting social change, especially in statutory adoption
proceedings), see King v. S.B., 837 N.E.2d 965, 969 (Ind. 2005) (Dickson, J.,
dissenting) (asserting that the majority opinion in a former lesbian partners
case opened "a veritable Pandora's Box of troublesome" issues). See also
Parker, 916 So. 2d, at 934 (ruling on the extrinsic/intrinsic fraud distinction in
paternity misrepresentation cases involving requested relief from earlier
judgment over a year old, the court opined that countervailing "relevant policy
considerations ...

are best addressed by the legislature").

291. See, e.g., County of Fresno v. Sanchez, 37 Cal. Rptr. 3d 192 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2005) (describing a General Assembly override, less than four months
later, of an appellate court decision on the standards for reopening of default

paternity judgments by nongenetic fathers).

2006]

PaternityDisestablishmentLaw in Illinois

1341

Paternity disestablishment reforms would be well served by a
statewide taskforce inquiry into the varied techniques for
establishing and undoing legal paternity designations. Such an
inquiry should now be prompted, perhaps by the General
Assembly or by the Illinois State Bar Association (perhaps at the
urging of the Illinois Supreme Court).
CONCLUSION

The resolution of the case of Romel Smith, Valerie Dawson,
and Kendra Smith failed to bring clarity to certain paternity
disestablishment proceedings in Illinois. More significantly, the
high court decision suggests that new law reform initiatives are
needed in Illinois (if not Congress) regarding certain paternity
establishments and disestablishments. Sound public policy (and
perhaps due process and equal protection) demand that American
lawmakers again promote more vigorously the early, accurate,
informed, and conclusive designations of fathers-in-law around the
time children are born. In particular, legal standards should
promote more fully birth certificate designations of paternity.
They should also dictate that when earlier paternity designations
do not accurately reflect the necessary genetic ties, paternity
disestablishment guidelines should be more fair and just.

